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INTRODUCTION

The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice
(hereinafter “HCJ”), may issue habeas corpus “orders for the release
of persons unlawfully detained or imprisoned.”1 The literal meaning
of the writ in Latin is “you have the body,”2 and its purpose is to
preserve individual liberty by reviewing the legality of a person’s
arrest or detention. The importance of habeas corpus in common law
cannot be overstated.3 A habeas corpus petition is considered an
* Associate Professor, Netanya Academic College, School of Law; Ph.D. (1995),
Faculty of Law Bar-Ilan University.
** Associate Professor, Netanya Academic College, School of Law; S.J.D. (2003)
University of Virginia School of Law.
We are grateful to Justice Daphne Barak-Erez (Israeli Supreme Court), Steven M.
Wise, Ariel L. Bendor, Leslie Y. Garfield Tenzer, Menachem Mautner, Jill Anzalone,
Michael Birnhack, Yair Sagy, Nir Kedar, Yoash Meisler, Meital Pinto, Olga Frishman,
Sharon Wintle, the participants in the annual conference of the Israeli Organization
for History and Law.
1. § 15(d)(1), Judicature, 5744–1984, LSI 38 101 (1983–84), as amended (Isr.).
2. Habeas Corpus, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
3. See JUDITH FARBEY & ROBERT J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 1–20 (1989)
(discussing the practical importance of habeas corpus); see also DAVID CLARK & GERARD
MCCOY, THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHT: HABEAS CORPUS IN THE COMMONWEALTH
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essential component of the defense of individual liberty, and by
extension of all basic rights and liberties, in the Anglo-American legal
tradition.
It is interesting to note that the right to habeas corpus serves
today as a cornerstone of the constitutional law of many countries
around the world, even those without strong links to Anglo-American
common law.4 In the past two decades, this has been not only a
tradition, but rather a living reality of American constitutional law, to
a large degree due to the legal proceedings, which accompanied the
imprisonment of many illegal fighters following the terror attacks of
September 11, 2001.5 But the lively debate in the United States about
the function and limits of habeas corpus continues. This discussion
encompasses suits concerning post-conviction, immigration, and
extradition,6 as well as cases that seek to reach new constitutional
frontiers, i.e., whether to provide relief in conditions of confinements
due to the Covid-19 pandemic,7 or should the right to habeas corpus
be accorded to animals.8
(2000).
4. However, the effectiveness of the writ varies between countries. On the
globalization of habeas corpus, see Brian Farrell, From Westminster to the World: The
Right to Habeas Corpus in International Constitutional Law, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. REV.
551 (2009). On the effort to establish habeas corpus in international law, see Luis
Kutner, World Habeas Corpus: A Legal Absolute for Survival, 39 U. DET. L. J. 279 (1962);
Leonard B. Sutton, Habeas Corpus: Its Past, Present and Possible World-Wide Future,
44 DENV. U. L. REV. 548 (1967); Vicki C. Jackson, World Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 303 (2006).
5. The U.S. Supreme Court’s deliberations on this subject reached their peak in
2008. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (establishing that the right to
habeas corpus must be given to detainees in the U.S. Navy’s detention center in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); see also Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas
Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 753 (2013); Stephen I. Vladek, Book Note, The New Habeas
Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2011); Joshua Alexander Gletzer, Of Suspension,
Due Process, and Guantanamo: The Reach of the Fifth Amendment After Boumediene
and the Relationship Between Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 719
(2012); Joshua M. Lott, The End of Innocence? Federal Habeas Corpus Law After In Re
Davis, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 443 (2011); Brian R. Farrel, Habeas Corpus in Times of
Emergency: A Historical and Comparative View, 1 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION
74 (2010); Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007).
6. See Vladek, supra note 5, at 941. See generally Bernardo Villarreal Aguirre,
Immigration and the Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 44 MARSHALL L. REV. 117
(2020) (discussing the correlation and effect of habeas corpus on immigration).
7. See generally Allison Wexler Weiss, Habeas Corpus, Conditions of
Confinement, and Covid-19, 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 131 (2020) (arguing
that courts should grant motions for habeas corpus by individuals that are highly
susceptible to serious health effects arising from Covid-19).
8. See Steven M. Wise, Introduction to Animal Law Book, 67 SYRACUSE L. REV. 7,
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By contrast to these developments in the American legal scene,
in the last few decades a sharp decline in the conspicuousness of
habeas corpus writs can be noted in Israeli law.9 The great
constitutional cases of the last few decades—even those dealing with
classic habeas corpus matters, such as liberty from unlawful
imprisonment in security and criminal matters—are no longer
adjudicated as habeas corpus cases. Our claim is that a review of the
present state of these writs in Israeli law will reveal a stagnation or
even a deterioration. Moreover, this condition is particularly evident
in light of their important role in the formative era of Israeli
constitutional law.10
This Article examines the decline of habeas corpus in Israeli law
and identifies the factors for this decline. We identify three factors for
the decline of habeas corpus: (1) the development of statutory
alternatives in matters previously controlled by habeas corpus,
making it superfluous; (2) habeas corpus rulings in prominent fields,
such as child kidnappings and security detentions, lacked a
procedural or substantive characterization and in the absence of a
procedural or substantive characterization, it was condemned to
stagnation even where there was no legislative development, and
certainly where there was; and (3) starting from Israel’s
Constitutional Revolution in 1995, which was characterized by the
adoption of judicial review of primary legislation, we note a
preference of the Justices of the HCJ to adjudicate cases of human
liberty by directly review primary legislation in accordance with the
tests of section 8 of the Limitation Clause of Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty.11
These three factors reflect a tendency towards grandiose
constitutional engineering over case-by-case constitutional
20–30 (2017); Richard L. Cupp Jr., Litigating Nonhuman Animal Personhood, 50 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 573, 579–89 (2018); Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln IV, Aristotle and
Animal Law: The Case for Habeas Corpus, 55 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 11–15 (2020). Recently,
In Re Nonhuman Rights Project v. Breheny, the New York Court of Appeals ruled by a
vote of 5 to 2 that the petitioner Nonhuman Rights Project may not seek habeas
corpus relief on behalf of Happy, an elephant at the Bronx Zoo, in order to transfer
Happy
to
an
elephant
sanctuary.
See
https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/Decisions/2022/Jun22/52opn22-Decision.pdf.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See § 8 Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752–1992 SH 150 (1992), as amended
(Isr.) (“There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law
befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an
extent no greater than is required.”).
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engineering of the space of human liberty. This preference is evident
both in the activity of the legislature and in the rulings of the HCJ. In
other words, while habeas corpus had previously been used in a
pattern like that of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’12—on a case-by-case
basis—in the age following Israel’s Constitutional Revolution, the
Israeli legislature, called the Knesset, and the HCJ prefer (each for its
own reasons) to regulate in a direct and comprehensive fashion, the
basic structure of the society in relation to human liberty.
The Article proceeds as follows: in Part I we describe the origin
and adoption of habeas corpus in Israeli law. In Part II we discuss the
decline of habeas corpus in Israeli law. In Part III we identify leading
factors to the decline of habeas corpus, representing a systemic and
normative preference to minimize habeas corpus. First, we look at the
development of statutory alternatives. Second, we examine two types
of habeas corpus decisions in two prominent subjects previously
controlled by the writs—child kidnapping and security matters—and
show that it lacks a procedural and substantive characterization.
Third, we consider the effect of Israel’s Constitutional Revolution on
habeas corpus litigation and adjudication.
II.

THE ORIGIN OF HABEAS CORPUS AND ITS ADOPTION IN ISRAEL

Habeas corpus emerged in English common law in the Middle
Ages,13 in the context of the political power struggle between the
courts and other authorities, and of the conglomeration of authority
by the English courts. Habeas corpus developed as a Crown
prerogative,14 whose original purpose was to mandate the
12. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, Ch. 2 (Bruce Mazlish ed., 1961).
13. For a comprehensive and in-depth historical account of the development
of habeas corpus in English law from antiquity to modern times, see PAUL D. HALLIDAY,
HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010). See also WILLIAM F. DUKER, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 3–94 (1980); CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE
PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES: HABEAS CORPUS AND THE OTHER COMMON LAW WRITS,
1–6 (1st Vol. 1987).
14. For a general explanation of prerogative writs in English law and their
development, see generally S.A. De Smith, The Prerogative Writs, 11 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 40
(1951) (giving a general account of the nature and development of the prerogative
writs); Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L. J. 523 (1923)
(discussing the use of habeas corpus in english common law). The prerogative writs
are: (1) Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which requires a person imprisoned or in
private detention on a criminal charge to be brought before the court; (2) Certiorari,
which instructs charges, writs or convictions by lower tribunals to be dropped; (3) A
prohibitive writ, warning lower tribunals and courts not to exceed their authority; (4)
Mandamus, which puts in force a public obligation. Having examined the

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol42/iss2/2

4

2022

THE DECLINE OF HABEAS CORPUS IN ISRAEL

277

appearance of various persons—litigants, witnesses and jury—before
the king’s courts.15 In the subsequent centuries of the writ’s
development, it was used at first by the king’s courts in order to
review the legality of arrests made by other local courts.16 At the end
of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century, against a
background of an intensifying political struggle between the king and
Parliament, courts began to use habeas corpus to free prisoners held
by the king and his representatives with no legal grounds.17 During
this period, habeas corpus also began to be used to regulate “private”
detentions: women imprisoned by their husbands, children who were
kidnapped or in the midst of a custody battle, and slaves.18 The
English Parliament’s attempts to strengthen the writ of habeas corpus
by entrenching its accessibility through positive legislation, and to
limit the power of the Crown to imprison subjects, mostly ended in
failure. However, they did manage to establish habeas corpus in the
legal consciousness as a first-rate guarantee of human liberty.19
During this very same period, and drawing on the English tradition,
the founding fathers of the United States saw fit to ground the
development of the writs, De Smith concludes that progressive writs only began to be
identified with the Crown’s rights and the king’s authorities starting in the
seventeenth century. However, a thorough examination of the development of the
writs shows that each writ developed gradually and serially, from case to case, slowly
acquiring its unique characteristics, and hence it is actually impossible to find the
common characteristics of all prerogative writs. DeSmith’s conclusion is therefore
that despite the fact that the term “prerogative writs” is familiar to any AngloAmerican legal scholar, it is not possible to give a satisfying answer to the question
“what are prerogative writs?”, besides for establishing that they are identified with
the king’s authority.
15. See DUKER, supra note 13, at 12–18.
16. See id. at 33–44; HALLIDAY, supra note 13, at 27.
17. See HALLIDAY, supra note 13, at 165–74.
18. See id. at 124–32, 174–76; Vladek, supra note 5, at 950.
19. William Blackstone, for instance, held that the writ of habeas corpus serves
as a bulwark of the British Constitution and the greatest guarantee of human liberty.
Similarly, he said that the law of habeas corpus legislated in the British Parliament in
order to protect the authority of courts to issue such writs constitutes a second Magna
Carta. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 129, 135 (3rd
Vol.1772); see also DUKER, supra note 13, at 7. On the constitutional importance of the
writ of habeas corpus see The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The
establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex post facto laws, and
of TITLES OF NOBILITY, to which we have no corresponding provision in our
Constitution, are perhaps greater securities to liberty and republicanism than any it
contains. The creation of crimes after the commission of the fact, or, in other words,
the subjecting of men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were
breaches of no law, and the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages,
the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny.”).
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availability of the writ in the American Constitution.20
Inspired by this venerable tradition, the Israeli Supreme Court
sought to establish the use of habeas corpus writs in Israeli law by
virtue of its subject matter jurisdiction and the legal tradition of
common law. Section 15(d)(1) of Basic Law: Judicature (1984)
specifies that Israel’s highest court, the HCJ, has jurisdiction to “issue
warrants to release individuals unlawfully detained or imprisoned.”21
This authority to issue writs of habeas corpus by the Supreme Court
was established originally in section 7(a) of the Courts Ordinance,
1940 by the British Mandate colonial legislature, stating: “[t]he High
Court of Justice shall have exclusive jurisdiction in the following
matters: . . . applications (in the nature of habeas corpus proceedings)
for orders of release of persons unlawfully detained in custody.”22
Following its foundation after the establishment of the State of
Israel, the Israeli HCJ established its jurisdiction to issue habeas
corpus, relying on its original legislative authority and accepted
common law practices.23 The great constitutional decisions of the HCJ
in the period of the founding of the State of Israel concerned habeas
corpus issues, continuing the English tradition. Hence, in the midst of
the War of Independence, in the El-Karbutli v. Minister of Defense, a

20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. On the adoption of habeas corpus in the U.S.
Constitution and its development in accompanying legislation, see generally Dallin H.
Oaks, Legal History in the Supreme Court, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1966) (discussing the
historical use of habeas corpus in federal courts); Francis Pascal, Habeas Corpus and
the Constitution, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605 (1970); Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus of 1867:
The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (1965) (discussing
application and interpretation of habeas corpus over time); Gary Peller, In Defense of
Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 579 (1982) (discussing
historical application of habeas corpus); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?:
The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1997 (1992); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993); Alan
Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 375 (1998).
21. § 15(d)(1), Judicature, 5744–1984, LSI 38 101 (1983–84), as amended
(Isr.).
22. Courts Ordinance, 1940, § 7, PALESTINE GAZETTE, Supp. 1, 1940, at 144. After
the founding of the state of Israel, the writ was formalized in Hebrew as § 7(b)(1)
Courts Law, 5717–1957 LSI. 11 158, which is known today as § 15(d)(1) of Basic Law:
Judicature. See also HAIM COHEN, The First Fifty Years of the State of Israel, 24 J. Sup.
Ct. His. 3, 10 (1999) (discussing the role of habeas corpus in the Supreme court of
Israel).
23. See COHEN, supra note 22; Joseph Laufer, Israel's Supreme Court: The First
Decade, 17 LEGAL EDUC. 43, 44 (1964). For a general and historical review of the
foundation of the Supreme Court and its powers, see Yair Sagy, The Missing Link: Legal
Historical Institutionalism and the Israeli High Court of Justice, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 703, 716–20 (2014).
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prisoner suspected of collaborating with enemy forces, was released
because of the absence of an administrative appeal committee that
would review his objections to his arrest.24 Similarly, in the El-Koury
v. IDF Chief of Staff, a man suspected of maliciously preventing
members of the Negba kibbutz from receiving assistance, was
released from administrative detention, due to an apparent technical
flaw in the arrest warrant, which did not specify the place of his
arrest.25 In these petitions, the question under consideration was
whether the respondent was able to legally justify the detention of the
plaintiff.
Accordingly, habeas corpus jurisprudence during the HCJ’s
formative years was the most noticeable of all other subject matter
adjudication in both its quality and importance. The HCJ’s justices
often praised and extolled the importance of these petitions, referring
to the English tradition which associates habeas corpus with the idea
of personal liberty.
For example, in the El-Koury case, which was perceived by many
legal scholars as the keystone of public law and the defense of human
rights,26 Justice Agranat embraced the presumption of innocence, a
foundational convention of English common law.27 This significant
principle, Agranat explained, applies in Israel too, by virtue of item 46
of the King’s Order in Council, since it does not contradict the
conditions of the land and its inhabitants, and also matches the spirit
24. See HCJ 7/48 El-Karbutli v. Minister of Defense, 2 P.D. 5 (1949) (Isr.); see
also Richard Gladstein, Administrative Detention in Israel and the Occupied Territories,
1 ANTIOCH L.J. 87, 99 (1981); Barak Cohen, Empowering Constitutionalism with Text
from an Israeli Perspective, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 585, 642 FN 259 (2003).
25. See HCJ 95/49 El-Koury v. IDF Chief of Staff, 4 P.D. 34 (1950) (Isr.).
26. See id. (instructing to release petitioner, despite evidence that he had
murdered and inflicted violence on Jews, due to the fact that the warrant for his arrest
did not specify the place of arrest, in violation of the requirements of ordinance
111(1) of The Defense Regulations (Emergency), 1945, supplement 2, 858). On the
importance of the El-Koury case and its formalistic nature see MENACHEM MAUTNER,
LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 75, 82 (2011). According to Mautner, in the formative
years of the State of Israel human rights were protected by means of legal formalism,
and the El-Koury case is representative of the use made by Supreme Court judges of
formalism for the advancement of a liberal world view.
27. This axiom is known as the principle of individual liberty, and is an
important component in the ideal of the rule of law and part of the unwritten
constitution of the State of Israel. According to the principle of individual liberty, the
individual is free to do as he or she pleases so long as the legislature has not limited
or narrowed this liberty. It follows that freedom to act is the obvious default rule,
while limitations on freedom of action are the exception which require positive proof.
See Amos Shapira, Judicial Review Without a Constitution: The Israeli Paradox, 56
TEMPLE L. Q. 405, 418 (1983).
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of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel
(hereinafter: the Declaration of Independence),28 which asserted that
the State of Israel will be founded on principles of liberty and justice.29
However, Agranat continued, “declarations regarding individual
liberty are one thing, and the implementation of this right is
another.”30 Drawing on the scholar Albert Venn Dicey, Justice Agranat
ruled that a pledge of allegiance to the principle of liberty is
insufficient, but also requires actual implementation. This is the role
of the writ of habeas corpus:
In England, as is well known, the problem was
resolved a long time ago by the creation of the famous
remedy known as habeas corpus ad subjiciendum,
which was granted to any person who complained of
an unlawful arrest. This remedy served the one and
only purpose of allowing the court to review the
legality of the current arrest of the complainant. If it
found he was unlawfully arrested, he was to be
released immediately.31
Another case in the formative years of the Israeli Supreme Court
which emphasizes the importance of habeas corpus for individual
liberty, while relying on the English tradition, is Rimon v. Rimon,
decided in 1950,32 which was one of the first cases to deal with child
kidnapping. In this case, a mother of a minor appealed for the child’s
‘release’ from custody in the hands of relatives of the woman’s
husband, who had committed suicide.33 She requested a habeas
corpus writ to be issued by the HCJ.34 The husband’s family tried to
defend themselves by relying in part on the argument of an alternative
remedy, since the claimant could have sued for custody in the local
District Court, which was authorized at the time to adjudicate custody
disputes.35
28. See Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708–1948 LSI
1 3–5 (1948), as amended.
29. HCJ 95/49 El-Koury v. IDF Chief of Staff, 4 P.D. 34 (1950) (Isr.).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 38.
32. See HCJ 113/50 Rimon v. Rimon, 4 P.D. 781 (1950) (Isr.); see also Chaim I.
Goldwater, Enforcing Foreign Custody Orders, 10 ISR. L. REV. 135, at n. 2 (1975).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See HCJ 113/50 Rimon v. Rimon, 4 P.D. 784 (1950) (Isr.).
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To this argument, Justice Shneor Zalman Cheshin responded that
one should not ignore the point of writs of habeas corpus, “meant to
serve as an efficient means for instant deliverance from unlawful or
unjust detention.”36 Moreover, Justice Cheshin emphasized that even
if a citizen does have the option of an alternative remedy, “if that
remedy cannot be attained immediately, but only after long
deliberations, justice requires that the petitioner will not be rejected
or denied the remedy of a writ of habeas corpus.”37 Another claim
made by the respondents in Rimon was that habeas corpus was
designed to regulate the relations between an individual and the
government authorities, lest an individual’s personal rights be
curtailed by the state, and not to order relationships between private
individuals.38 To this Justice Cheshin responded:
Actually, the right to petition a court for a writ of
habeas corpus, to release a minor from custody and
return him to those responsible for his care—this
right is set out in the principles of common law, which
originate in antiquity . . . . ‘Whenever a minor is
unlawfully detained, he has the right to be released
from this illegal detention . . . as if he were an adult;
this right is reserved to him by the writ of habeas
corpus.39
These examples show clearly how the Israeli Supreme Court
sitting as a HCJ positioned itself as the ultimate champion of individual
liberty, relying on the grand English tradition of habeas corpus,
whether in the realm of the relationship between individuals and the
state, or the relationship between individuals themselves. In fact, we
can learn from here not only about the nature of the judicial function,
but also about the nature of Israel as a state that pursues liberty in the
tradition of habeas corpus. An instructive example of this can be
found in an article from the late 1970s written by Justice Berenson in
the legal journal Hapraklit:
In Israel, the authority of the Supreme Court is
established in positive law, which proclaims that the
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 786.
Id.
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court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine
matters necessary to be decided for the
administration of justice. Specifically, it will intervene
in cases of unlawful arrest or detention. . . The most
famous and important of these is the procedure of
habeas corpus, designed to defend civilians from
unlawful imprisonment, detention or arrest by public
authorities or even private citizens. This simple and
ancient procedure, instituted in England by its judges.
. . is what made that country and every one that
followed its example, including Israel, into a freedomloving country, which protects any individual in its
jurisdiction – citizen, resident, visitor, passerby etc. –
from an arbitrary denial of his liberty.40
This short, select resume of decisions and legal writings
demonstrates the honorable place habeas corpus assumed in the
Israeli constitutional framework. Its centrality and reflective status
have also had simple doctrinal implications. First, the petition of
habeas corpus did not require the showing of standing, and an
unlawfully imprisoned person will be released at anyone’s request.41
Second, habeas corpus was valued so highly that any request for
habeas corpus took precedence over discussion of any other matter.42
Third, even if the petitioner had access to alternative remedies in
other courts, the HCJ would have provided his habeas corpus request,
if this was deemed the fastest and most efficient means for securing
an individual’s release.43
III.

THE DECLINE OF HABEAS CORPUS

We identify a decline in the prominence of habeas corpus in

40. Tzvi Berenson, On the High Court of Justice, the Extent of its Authority and
the Right of Standing, 31 HAPRAKLIT 194, 194–95 (1977).
41. See id. at 195 (“If there is no legal basis for a person’s detention or arrest,
they will be released immediately by the court, according to the request of each
petitioner.”).
42. Id. (“The judges thought these matters were of such great importance that
a request for habeas corpus was granted precedence over all other litigations.”).
43. HCJ 113/50 Rimon v. Rimon, 4 P.D. 784 (1950) (Isr.).
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Israeli law over the last few decades.44 In criminal procedures,45 in
petitions by prisoners about the very fact of their imprisonment46 or
its conditions,47 in petitions by patients in mental health institutions48
and in custody disputes, the use of habeas corpus has virtually
disappeared.49 While it is true that petitions and requests for habeas
corpus in administrative contexts, and especially security-related
contexts, have become very frequent,50 even in these security-related
contexts most habeas corpus petitions are erased,51 rejected outright
or in part,52 so that only rarely does the HCJ agree to turn the
injunctive relief to a permanent one. In most security-related cases,
writs of habeas corpus have come to be used by petitioners to locate
detainees held by the security forces.53 It should also be noted that
44. The decline in the importance of habeas corpus can be seen even in
academic scholarship. As far as we are aware, no article or book about habeas corpus
in Israel has been published over the last thirty years, and no department or college
of law teaches a course on the topic.
45. See HCJ 4299/18 Blomberg v. The General Attorney, Nevo Legal Database
(2018) (Isr.) (a petition for habeas corpus “is not intended to replace the regular
criminal proceedings when there is no claim that the arrest was fundamentally
illegal”); see also HCJ 416/06 Misgav v. Chief of Staff of the Israeli Police, Nevo Legal
Database (2006) (Isr.). In both cases, the petitioner was denied habeas corpus
regarding their petitions.
46. See HCJ 4159/10 Atsmon v. Prison Authorities, Nevo Legal Database
(2010) (Isr.) (the habeas corpus petition of a prisoner, whose final judgment was
being delayed, was rejected on the grounds that “the petitioner’s arguments belong
in the criminal procedure track rather than as a petition to the Supreme Court.”).
47. See Criminal Matters Request 7053/01 Anonymous v. State of Israel, 56(1)
P.D. 504 (2001) (Isr.).
48. Patients forcefully committed to psychiatric wards applying for habeas
corpus must first exhaust the procedures set out by the Care of the Mentally Disturbed
Law of 1991. See, e.g., HCJ 5487/98 Navarro v. District Psychiatrist, Nevo Legal
Database (2000) (Isr.).
49. See, e.g., HCJ 5479/06 Mazurin v. State of Israel, Nevo Legal Database
(2006) (Isr.).
50. See HCJ 8208/16 Zain v. IDF Commander in West Bank, Nevo Legal
Database (2016) (Isr.); HCJ 2586/16 Ashrif v. State of Israel, Nevo Legal Database
(2016) (Isr.); HCJ 4169/10 Cohen v. Minister of Defense, Nevo Legal Database (2010)
(Isr.). The preceding cases are used to illustrate how frequently habeas corpus cases
are brought before the court.
51. See HCJ 8354/20 Anonymous v. IDF Commander in West Bank, Nevo Legal
Database (2020) (Isr.).
52. See HCJ 3208/09 Bakhry v. Ofer Camp Court of Appeals, Nevo Legal
Database (2009) (Isr.).
53. See, e.g., HCJ 7206/20 Anonymous v. IDF Commander in West Bank, Nevo
Legal Database (2020) (Isr.) (the writ of habeas corpus was filed to trace the
whereabouts of the petitioner who had been detained by Israeli security forces); HCJ
8189/19 Musalem v. IDF Commander in West Bank, Nevo Legal Database (2019)
(Isr.) (writ was filed in order to compel respondents to inform what happened to the
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habeas corpus decisions in recent decades no longer include
encomiums to the importance of habeas corpus for individual liberty
in the English traditions or Israeli law.
At the same time, there is a weakening of the doctrine of habeas
corpus, so that often the Supreme Court rejects a petition for habeas
corpus by referring to an alternative remedy, exhaustion of
proceedings, or the petitioner’s lack of standing.54 As noted, in earlier
times it was well accepted that even if an alternative remedy existed,
the HCJ will provide habeas corpus warrants, since they are the best
guarantee for human liberty. For the same reason, the HCJ also agreed
to issue a habeas corpus writ at the request of any petitioner, without
insisting that he satisfy the requirements of standing.55
The following cases may serve as examples of the decline of
habeas corpus. In the Gutman v. State of Israel, decided in 2008,56 the
petitioner requested a writ of habeas corpus in order to release from
arrest seven minors who refused to divulge their names, and had been
arrested for allegedly entering a forbidden security area, criminal
trespassing and disturbing a police officer from doing his job. The
Court rejected the request for habeas corpus, citing the availability of
an alternative remedy57 and the petitioner’s lack of legal standing.58
Another case that attests to the decline of habeas corpus is the
Merichik v. Judge Nitsa Maimon-Shaashua, also decided in 2008.59 In
this case, the petitioner petitioned against the decision of the
petitioner who had been arrested by Israeli security forces); HCJ 10058/07 Anati v.
IDF Commander in West Bank, Nevo Legal Database (2008) (Isr.) (writ filed by
petitioner in order to request respondent to answer what happened to petitioner
after he was arrested by Israeli security forces).
54. See HCJ 7131/20 Turgeman v. State of Israel, Nevo Legal Database (2020)
(Isr.) (petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus petition was rejected because of “existence
of an alternative remedy.”); HCJ 5479/06 Mazurin v. State of Israel, Nevo Legal
Database (2006) (Isr.) (petitioner’s writ was rejected because they had no status
regarding the minor they wished to protect).
55. See Berenson, supra note 40 (“The jurisdiction of the HCJ extends to any
governmental or public matter that is not under the jurisdiction of another court of
tribunal. In this country a very broad interpretation was adopted to both types of
matters that the court may hear, the remedies it may grant to citizens affected by the
authorities’ actions or inactions and placing the public bodies under review.”).
56. HCJ 428/08 Gutman v. State of Israel, Nevo Legal Database (2008) (Isr.).
57. Id. at ¶ 4 (Procaccia, J., opinion). The HCJ explained that the minors’ case is
being handled in criminal procedures in accordance with criminal law. Hence, there
is a clear alternative remedy in their case, and no need for the HCJ.
58. Id.
59. HCJ 5045/08 Merichik v. Judge Nitsa Maimon-Shaashua, Nevo Legal
Database (2008) (Isr.).
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Magistrate Court of Kefar-Saba to keep her in custody in order to
secure her attendance of hearings in a criminal process held in that
same court.60 The District Court determined that despite the
existence of a reason to hold her under arrest, the requirement of
section § 21b in the 1996 Criminal Justice Remedy Law (Enforcement
Authority – Arrests) had not been met, according to which no arrest
warrant may be served prior to presenting evidence for guilt. The
Magistrate Court was accordingly requested to examine the evidence
against the appellant.61 However, the hearing at the Magistrate Court
was to be held over ten days later, and it was promised that a decision
would be reached fifteen days after the decision by the District Court.
In fact, during all this time Merichik was held in a legally dubious
detention, and despite the District Court’s ruling, no hearing was held
about her case.
Merichik petitioned the HCJ against its continued arrest. Justice
Edmond Levy expressed his indignation at this kind of treatment of
the petitioner, and remarked that the detention without a hearing
stemmed from “[f]or various reasons, which I find difficult to
reconcile with the fundamental right to liberty from detention. . . .” 62
However, the HCJ decided to reject the petition, not because
Merichik’s lawyer rushed to submit it before the expected decision of
the Magistrate Court, but because the HCJ is not the correct court for
reviewing the claim. If the petitioner wishes to appeal the decision to
detain her, she must do so in the way prescribed by law, which a
petition to the HCJ cannot replace.63
In this decision, we see a separation of the idea of liberty from the
procedure of habeas corpus. If habeas corpus is the best guarantee of
human liberty, how can we reconcile the risk of damaging the basic
right to liberty with the claim that the HCJ is not the appropriate
forum, and that decisions about detentions should be reached
according to the way established by law? As mentioned, the
60. Id. The appellant was accused of trespassing, attacking a police officer and
refusal to show signs of identification, while she was biting and beating police officers
removing her from the Shvut Ami settlement in Samaria. After her arrest, she refused
to have her picture taken or given fingerprints. Since that incident, she had been
under continuous arrest, as she refused to comply with the conditions of detention.
The arrest was prolonged from time to time by fixed terms, until the Magistrate Court
decided that if its conditions are not satisfied, she would remain under arrest until
the end of legal procedures.
61. See id.
62. Id. at ¶ 5 (Levy, J., opinion).
63. See id. at ¶ 6.
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availability of an alternative remedy of the claim that the appellant
lacks legal standing did not prevent courts from issuing the writ. In
other words, habeas corpus was not perceived previously as a final
remedy, which may only be employed as a last resort.
Another example may be found in the case of Anonymous v. the
Israeli Police.64 The petitioner had been arrested and interrogated in
the Judea and Samaria police district, under suspicion for several
crimes, including contact with an enemy agent, intent to form a
conspiracy, and intent to cause a person’s death.65 A request for the
extension of the petitioner’s detention, presented to the Jerusalem
Magistrate Court, was rejected, since the Court felt it was not
authorized to make this decision in the absence of conditions
permitting the application of Israeli Criminal law.66 The State’s appeal
to the District Court was also rejected under the same reasoning, that
the Court lacked the authority to rule on the prolongation of the
appellant’s detention.67 However, the District Court judge delayed the
release of the appellant to allow the State to inform the appellant’s
attorney whether it planned to make another appeal to the Supreme
Court.68 Instead, the State made a request to the Military Court of
Judea and Samaria to extend the appellant’s arrest by seven days.69
The Military Court determined that it is authorized to rule on the
matter, and instructed the police to extend the appellant’s arrest by
four days.70 At this point, the appellant turned to the District Court,
asking to be released because of contempt of court. The District Court
refused, arguing that if a claim of unlawful arrest is to be made, it
should be presented to the Military Court.71 The appellant finally
petitioned for the HCJ for a habeas corpus remedy. The HCJ ordered
the deletion of the petition due to the availability of an alternative
remedy, since the appellant could have appealed his case to the
Military Court of Appeals. Given this option, the Justices wrote, there
was no need to petition to the HCJ and to describe this as an
emergency petition. The judges even expressed their doubts whether
this petition should have been defined as a habeas corpus one,
64. See generally HCJ 594/16 Anonymous v. Israeli Police Judea & Samaria
Division & The Judean Military Court, Nevo Legal Database ¶ 2 (2016) (Isr.).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at ¶ 6.
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“because it is largely directed against the substance of the decision of
the Military Court.”72 The judges noted that they were not “taking any
position about the merits of the allegations raised in the matter of the
petitioner’s arrest.”73
Such doubts regarding the definition of the petition as a habeas
corpus are further evidence for the erosion of its status. It seems that
in their opinion, the Justices were relying on a distinction between
claims of procedural defects or lack of authority, which arise in the
decision to detain, and claims of substantial defects in the Military
Court’s decision to extend the arrest. Habeas corpus is concerned with
fundamental defects in procedure and authority.74
Defects
concerning the substance of a decision should be appealed through
the usual channels in the Military Court of Appeals.
This sharp distinction made by the judges, in the absence of a
discussion about the substance of the claims, or at least about the kind
of claims that would merit the right of habeas corpus, is problematic.
Not only because it reflects a very dichotomous distinction between
claims about jurisdiction and claims about substance, but also from a
historical perspective of habeas corpus. Indeed, in Anglo-American
law, habeas corpus procedures are not regularly intended to
determine the guilt or innocence of the detainee, but rather whether
the arrest meets general guidelines and rules.75 However, many
scholars have recognized the fact that many of the procedural matters
determined by a court in issuing a writ of habeas corpus are tied to
substantial questions of liberty and justice.76
The case of Anonymous v. Israeli Police demonstrates that habeas
corpus is perceived by the Justices of the HCJ as a remedy of last
resort, given only in special cases of lack of authority.77 Do the
circumstances of the arrest of the detainee in the case of Anonymous
v. Israeli Police—attempts to detain the appellant through the civil law
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See HCJ 4299/18 Blomberg v. The General Attorney, Nevo Legal Database
¶ 13 (2018) (Isr.) (Barak-Erez, J., opinion) (explaining that habeas corpus concerns
“fundamentally illegal” arrests or detentions in regard to extradition).
75. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963); Roger Berkowitz, ErrorCentricity, Habeas Corpus and the Rule of Law as the Law of Rulings, 64 LA. L. REV. 477,
480 (2004).
76. See STEVEN M. STATSINGER, HABEAS CORPUS: PRACTICE, COMMENTARIES AND
STATUTES, 1, 9–10 (2d ed. 2007).
77. See HCJ 594/16 Anonymous v. Israeli Police Judea & Samaria Division &
The Judean Military Court, Nevo Legal Database (2016) (Isr.).
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system and his subsequent unilateral transfer to the military
tribunal—not merit a discussion of the substance of his claims, or at
least about their nature? Concisely put, our argument is that the HCJ
reserves habeas corpus only for cases of lack of authority, and that it
interprets lack of authority in a very specific, narrow sense.78 A
further implication is that habeas corpus becomes a residual and
irrelevant remedy for most cases of detention, which are not clear-cut
cases of lack of authority. This is the present state of habeas corpus.
However, remnants of the centrality of habeas corpus in Israeli
constitutional law may still be found today. In Anonymous v. State of
Israel,79 the Supreme Court, sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeals,
struck down section 5(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a
Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision), 2006.80 This law
allowed for a hearing regarding the extension of a security suspect’s
arrest without their presence. One could argue that the Supreme
Court overruled this law because of its impingement on habeas
corpus,81 and that in this it resembles Boumediene v. Bush,82 where the
United States Supreme Court struck down a congressional law
limiting the right to petition the courts detention of persons in the U.S.
Navy’s Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. This judgment was described by
scholars83 as significant and groundbreaking on a few levels,
78. See id. at ¶ 9–10. Thus, for example, one may have adopted a less stringent
cause of intervention, including defects pertaining to the root of the procedure as a
test for applying habeas corpus.
79. Criminal Matter Request 8823/07 Anonymous v. State of Israel, 63(3) P.D.
500, (2010) (Isr.).
80. Id. ¶ 2. Section 5 of the Statute reads:
5. Hearing held in the absence of an arrestee suspected of committing a security
offense
…
(2) The court may order that a hearing concerning an application for a
rehearing pursuant to s. 52 of the Arrests Law or of an appeal pursuant to s.
53 of the said statute be held in the arrestee’s absence — if an application
for such has been filed with the approval of the supervisor, and if the court
has been persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is
likely to cause material harm to the investigation.
81. See Suzi Navot, Habeas Corpus: In Light of Criminal Matter Case 8823/07, 34
BIDLATAIM PETUCHOT 48 (2010).
82. See generally 553 U.S. at 723.
83. See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and
Guantanamo: The Boumediene Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 (2008); Jonathan
Hafetz, Calling the Government to Account: Habeas Corpus in the Aftermath of
Boumediene, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 99, 109 (2011); Baher Azmy, Executive Detention,
Boumediene and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 449 (2010);
Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S.
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especially since, for the first time in history, the United States
Supreme Court had overruled a federal law seeking to limit the
authority of federal courts to accept petitions of habeas corpus. It was
decided for the first time—contrary to accepted and established
opinions—that the suspension clause in the American Constitution
bestows an affirmative right to petition a court for habeas corpus.84
In our view, the comparison between Anonymous v. State of Israel
and the Boumediene case is inapt, to say the least. In Anonymous v.
State of Israel, the Supreme Court justices accepted the appellant’s
position that a person may not be judged in absentia, since the
accused’s right to be present at his or her trial “is a core element of the
right to due process, and it is therefore a protected constitutional right
pursuant to” the Basic Law [Basic Law: Human Liberty and Dignity].”85
Justice Eliezer Rivlin explained that the “legal proceeding does not
deal with elements that are absent – it deals with elements that are
present.”86 In order to emphasize the importance of the presence of a
detainee at the hearing held in his or her case, Justice Rivlin made
reference to the habeas corpus tradition:
The importance and longevity of the principle
regarding the arrestee’s physical presence in court is
indicated by the doctrine whose name indicates its
logic — habeas corpus (“bring the body”). This
common law doctrine allows the court to be
petitioned to issue an order by which the authorities
are directed to bring before the court a person who
has been imprisoned by those authorities, so that he
can be released if it discovered that the arrest was
illegal. This power, which in Israel is conferred on the
CAL. L. REV. 259, 260–261 (2009); Steven I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access
to Court and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2110 (2009).
84. It should be pointed out that the court’s decision was at first qualified as
applying to the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the Boumediene case,
was not seen as ruling about the applicability of other constitutional defenses such as
the right to due process, freedom from arbitrary search and arrest, and more.
However, since the right of habeas corpus is a right to reviewing the constitutionality
of arrests, this review may in the end involve substantive constitutional instructions
found in other parts of the U.S. Constitution. For example, the Fifth Amendment’s
right to due process is most relevant in this context, and there is a rich scholarly
literature examining its application in the cases of prisoners in Guantanamo.
85. See Criminal Matter Request 8823/07 Anonymous v. State of Israel, 63(3)
P.D. 500, ¶ 17 (2010) (Isr.) (Rivlin, E., J., opinion).
86. Id.
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High Court of Justice, reflects the fundamental
perception that the court that is deciding the matter of
a person’s liberty will generally be required to see the
person and hear his arguments regarding the legality
of his detention.87
However, even these words raise doubts about the place of
habeas corpus in contemporary Israeli constitutional jurisprudence
and may even be exemplary of its present stagnation. If the extension
of a detention in the suspect’s absence is so wrong, why didn’t the
Supreme Court make use of writs of habeas corpus to minimize the
number of hearings in absentia, according to this law?
Furthermore, Anonymous v. State of Israel88 is far from being an
“Israeli Boumediene.” The importance of Boumediene lies in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s recognition of the very existence of a constitutional
right to habeas corpus, against the background of congressional
legislation which tried to deny imprisoned detainees in Guantanamo
the right to request habeas corpus remedies from federal courts.
Congress had not only diminished the right to habeas corpus, it had
even unambiguously overturned previous Supreme Court decisions
so that the diminished right to habeas corpus that was implemented
through statute would apply to pending cases.89 The entire tumult
concerned habeas corpus, with many dozens of appeals for habeas
corpus being presented, time after time, by many different appellants
to different courts.90
In Israel, the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus was
restricted to the HCJ by 15(d)(1) of Basic Law: Judicature. The
petition to strike down section 5(2) of the criminal law of 1997 was
not made in the form of a habeas corpus petition to the HCJ, nor as a
reaction for habeas corpus petitions made in regard to processes
taking place in lower courts. It was never argued by any of the
appellants, the State, or another party, that section 5(2) limits or
diminishes the authority of the Israeli Supreme Court to issue writs of
habeas corpus. Had there been a contradiction between section
87. Criminal Matter Request 8823/07 Anonymous v. State of Israel, 63(3) P.D.
500, ¶ 20 (2010) (Isr.) (Rivlin, E., J., opinion).
88. Criminal Matter Request 8823/07 Anonymous v. State of Israel, 63(3) P.D.
500 (2010) (Isr.).
89. See Meltzer, supra note 83, at 7.
90. See Matthew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why
Detain, and Detain Whom?, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 1 (2009).
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15(d)(1) of Basic Law: Judicature and section 5(2) of the said law, the
Supreme Court would have overruled section 5(2) by virtue of the
principles established in the case of Herut, the National Jewish
Movement v. Chairman of the Central Electoral Committee for the
Sixteenth Knesset,91 according to which an ordinary law may not
negate or diminish the authority of the Supreme Court established by
Basic Law: Judicature.
It was not claimed that there was a contradiction between
section 15(d)(1) of Basic Law: Judicature and section 5(2) because
there simply is no contradiction. The juridical authority of the Israeli
Supreme Court to issue habeas corpus was not damaged by section
5(2), especially in light of the fact that the court relies on a restrictive
interpretation of its authority to issue writs of habeas corpus,
reserving it for cases of breaches of authority, such as we have seen in
the case of Anonymous v. Israeli Police. A judge who orders the
continued detention of a detainee in the latter’s absence is acting
according to his or her authority by virtue of section 5(2), and an
appeal to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus would be
rejected based on the argument that there is no breach of authority in
the decision to continue the detention, and that substantial appeals
about the judge’s decision should be made through the regular
procedures of such appeals. True, the detainee’s right to due process
was damaged by the very possibility of ordering a prolongation of his
or her arrest in absentia, but not his or her right to habeas corpus (as
this is interpreted by the HCJ). The issue of habeas corpus was
mentioned casually by Justice Rivlin, but it is not crucial for the legal
decision in case Anonymous v. State of Israel.92 This affair, as well as
the others, attests to the poor condition in which habeas corpus is
found today. The questions that will occupy us in the remainder of
this Article are: what happened to habeas corpus? What factors led to
its decline?
IV.

THE FACTORS FOR THE DECLINE OF HABEAS CORPUS IN ISRAELI
JURISPRUDENCE

So whatever happened to habeas corpus? We wish to highlight
91. HCJ 212/03 Herut, the National Jewish Movement v. Chairman of the Central
Electoral Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset, 57(1) P.D. 750, ¶ 4 (2003) (Irs.) (Barak,
A., Chief Justice, opinion).
92. Criminal Matter Request 8823/07 Anonymous v. State of Israel, 63(3) P.D.
500 (2010) (Isr.).
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the factors which share one distinct common denominator, which is
that they focus our attention on the role of the Supreme Court in
Israeli society and its systemic position vis-à-vis other courts and
government authorities. We identify three factors—sometimes
overlapping, sometimes complementary—which have brought the
decline of habeas corpus: In Part A, we argue that legislative
developments in domains previously controlled by habeas corpus,
such as prisoner appeals and conflicts over child custody, have made
habeas corpus superfluous.93 These legislative developments brought
about both the development of substantive law, and the establishment
of alternative courts that were both lower and more available. In light
of these legislative developments, Supreme Court judges preferred to
position themselves as a court of appeals about those lower courts,
and decrease the use of habeas corpus.
We argue in Part B that a review of habeas corpus rulings on
specific subjects such as custody conflicts and security matters would
show that they lack any procedural or substantive character.94 The
guiding principle behind these rulings is the primacy of the rule of law,
in the sense of the subordination of citizens and government
authorities to the Supreme Court, but apart from this principle, there
is some difficulty in identifying any substantive or procedural
rationale characterizing habeas corpus. Accordingly, habeas corpus
rulings are characterized as promoting specific (procedural or
substantive) justice on a case-to-case basis. In the absence of any
procedural or substantive character, it is doomed to stagnation
especially in places where legislative developments took place.
Lastly, we argue in Part C that since the Constitutional
Revolution, we can identify a preference by Supreme Court justices to
discuss human liberty questions by means of a direct attack on
primary legislation and in accordance with the Limitation Clause tests
of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.95
The common denominator of these factors is a preference or
tendency for grandiose constitutional engineering96—whether by the
93. See infra Part A.
94. See infra Part B.
95. See infra Part C.
96. See Michael Birnhack, Privacy in Crisis: Constitutional Engineering and
Privacy Engineering, LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL (forthcoming 2021). Currently, the
article is available in Hebrew only. However, an English abstract is available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3650193.
We borrowed the term “constitutional
engineering” from Birnhak. In his article, Birnhak deals with two types of
engineering: constitutional engineering and privacy engineering.
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legislator or by the Supreme Court—over small-scale constitutional
engineering of the space of human liberty. In other words, habeas
corpus writs evolved case to case, while, by contrast, both the Israeli
Legislature (the “Knesset”) and the Israeli Supreme Court prefer to
advance and organize the space of human liberty in a wider, more
comprehensive and deeper fashion.
A. The Development of Statutory Alternatives for Habeas Corpus
One factor of the decline of habeas corpus can be traced to the
development of statutory alternatives. For example, child kidnapping
cases were controlled by habeas corpus decisions for over four
decades. In 1991, the State of Israel ratified the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction97 through the
passage of the Hague Convention Law (Return of Abducted Child).98
The Hague Convention Law and its accompanying convention brought
a significant change to the centrality of habeas corpus in cases of child
kidnappings.99
The Hague Convention Law requires the immediate return of
children kidnapped from their normal place of residence, and places
direct responsibility on the country where the child has been taken to
assist in locating and transferring the child to his or her normal place
of residence.100 This law permits a parent, whose child has been
kidnapped and brought to Israel from another country, to request that
the authorities of that country help locate and return the child. This
law has led to a great decline in habeas corpus petitions in child
kidnapping matters because the parent of the kidnapped child now
97. See generally Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. For a basic overview of the
objectives and mechanism of the Hague Convention, see Rhona Schuz, The Hague
Child Abduction Convention and Children’s Rights, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
393, 398–400 (2002).
98. See The Hague Convention (Return of Abducted Children) Law, 571–1991,
1991 S.H. 148 [hereinafter Hague Convention Law]. The Hague Convention Law
incorporates into Israeli Law the majority of the provisions of the Hague Convention
and accords them the force of law. The supplement to the Hague Convention Law
includes all the substantive provisions of the Hague Convention with identical
wording.
99. See Ariel Rosen-Zvi, Israel: Protection of Family Members and Strengthening
the Partnership between Spouses, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 367, 374–80 (1992)
(explaining the changes in Israeli legal practice concerning kidnapped children after
the Hague Convention Law).
100. See The Hague Convention art. 1.
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has more simple, accessible, and efficient means to demand for the
return of the child to their original country.101 The precedence that
the Hague Convention Law procedures have taken over habeas corpus
procedures also stems from the fact that we are not dealing with a
conflict between individual citizens, but a conflict between the state
from which the child has been kidnapped and the state to which they
has been taken, a fact that provides massive financial and legal
assistance to the side initiating the Hague Convention procedures.102
Moreover, acceptance of the Hague Convention is made obligatory by
the norms of international public law and the preservation of positive
foreign relations with the signatory countries of the Convention.
In fact, the Hague Convention does not deal directly with the
possibility of making habeas corpus petitions to the Supreme Court,
and prima facie, according to the Convention, the parent of a
kidnapped child still has the option of doing this.103 Nevertheless, the
HCJ held that in certain circumstances, a parent who has used Hague
Convention procedures is precluded from petitioning for habeas
corpus.104 The Court emphasized that the Hague Convention Law did
not strip the HCJ of the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus in
Hague Convention cases, but rather that the Court’s discretion
whether to exercise its power would take into consideration the fact
that the Convention was used instead.105
It is important to note that the Hague Convention’s statutory
alternative to habeas corpus is available only in cases of a kidnapping
between signatory states. In cases where a child is kidnapped from a
non-signatory state, there is no apparent change from the normative
conditions prevalent before the signing of the treaty, and the parent
may still petition the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus.106
101. See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 99, at 376–77.
102. See Schuz, supra note 97, at 465–466.
103. Article 29 of the Hague Convention declares: “This Convention Shall not
preclude any man, institution or body who claim that there has been a breach of
custody or access rights… from applying directly to the juridical or administrative
authorities of a Contracting State, whether or not under the provisions of this
Convention.”
104. HCJ 4365/97 Tur-Sinai v. Foreign Minister, 53(3) P.D. 673, 679 (1999)
(Isr).
105. See id.
106. See Rhona Schuz, The Relevance of Religious and Cultural Considerations in
International Child Abductions Disputes, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 453, 457 n.18 (2010).
According to Schuz, in habeas corpus non-Convention cases, the HCJ will order the
return of the child, unless the abductor can show that it would cause significant
irreversible harm to the child. Schuz also notes the Court held that this test is wider
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However, the Knesset enacted the Family Court Law in 1995,107 which
bestows exclusive authority over kidnapping cases involving minors
to the family court, including, not limited to, those covered by the
Hague Convention Law.108 Thus, today there is an alternative
statutory forum, the Family Court, which replaces habeas corpus
petitions to the HCJ.109 Indeed, since 1995 the vast majority of
Supreme Court hearings regarding child kidnappings are appeals of
rulings from the Family Court and not habeas corpus petitions.110
Another example of legislative developments that have led to the
decline of habeas corpus may be found in the domain of
administrative detention. The Emergency Powers (Detention) Law,
1979 (hereinafter “Detention Law”)111 replaced the relevant
regulations of administrative detention detailed in the Defense
(Emergency) Regulations, 1945. The new law gave the Minister of
Defense the authority to order the arrest without trial on the grounds
of state and public security. However, the law requires bringing the
detainee in front of the president of the District Court in the

than the exception of “grave risk” of harm, established by Article 13(b) of the Hague
Convention. See id. The list of Israeli Supreme Court cases cited by Schuz. See also
Rosen-Zvi, supra note 99, at 378. Thus, the differences between the Hague
Convention Law and the habeas corpus law are not solely procedural.
107. Family Court Law, 5755-1995 S.H. 393 (Isr.) [hereinafter Family Court
Law].
108. See id. ¶ 5 (listing several topics that would henceforth be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the family court, including claim in the matter of the return
of an abducted minor).
109. It remains an open question what is the substantive law, where the family
court will rule in non-Convention cases, but involve foreign jurisdiction or cases of
minors, whose personal or international connection to Israel is uncertain. While the
legislature authorized the family court to rule on child kidnappings, the legislature
did not discuss the question of the substantive laws, where the family court will
decide the non-Convention case. Hence, the substantive law regarding nonConvention child abductions remained the same and in accordance with the rules
established in the habeas corpus jurisprudence. On the different approaches to the
substantive law regarding child abductions not controlled by the Hague Convention
Law, see Leslie Kim Treiger, A Digest of Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of
Israel, 27 ISR. L. REV. 495, 502–04 (1993), reviewing HCJ 243/88 Konsloos v. Turgeman
45(2) 626 (1991) (Isr).
110. See LFA 741/11 Doe v. Doe, Nevo Legal Database (2011) (Isr.) (for a list of
Israeli Supreme Court cases cited there).
111. See The Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5729-1979 (Isr.). The new
statute was meant to replace the mandatory regulations with an Israeli law that
would meet modern “security needs and at the same time, as far as possible, protect
the principles of the rule of law.” See Itzhak Zamir, Administrative Detention, 18 ISR.
L. REV. 150, 150 (1983).
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jurisdiction where the arrest was made.112 The president of the
District Court is authorized to release the detainee if they are
convinced that the arrest was made without reasonable
considerations or reasonable grounds of state or public security.113
The detainee may then appeal this decision to the Supreme Court.114
This law, and the procedures it sets in motion, has endured heavy
criticism, because in its present form the law does not permit a
detainee to know the grounds which led to his detention and to
properly defend himself.115 For this reason, some scholars have called
for its replacement.116 Similar criticism has been made about the
similar, but not identical procedures prevalent in the West Bank, in
accordance with the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 and the
Security Affairs Law (Judea and Samaria) (No. 1651) of 2009.117
It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the Hague Convention,
appeals and requests for habeas corpus in security matters are
extremely common, probably due to the insufficiency of the Detention
Law from the point of view of the detainee.118 However, in security
matters, the majority of appeals for writs of habeas corpus are
deleted,119 rejected outright or rejected de facto as well.120 The
Supreme Court makes clear that habeas corpus should not be invoked
while the petitioner is held in proper administrative detention. In
112.
113.
114.
115.

The Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5729-1979 § 4a (Isr.).
See id. § 4c.
See id. § 7a.
See ELAD GIL ET AL., EXTREME MEASURES FOR COMBATTING TERROR:
ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, HOUSE DEMOLITION, DEPORTATION AND RESIDENCE READJUSTMENT,
iv-vii (2010).
116. See id.
117. Another legislative development regarding detentions is the enactment
by the Knesset of the Detention of Unlawful Combatants Law of 2002, where the IDF
Chief of Staff is authorized to order the detention of unlawful enemy combatants, and
is subject to judicial review by the District Court. Since the enactment of the Detention
of Unlawful Combatants Law, detentions of unlawful combatants are heard on
appeals to the Supreme Court and not as a petition for habeas corpus. See Joshua
Segev, Detaining Unlawful Enemy Combatants in Israel: A Matter of Misinterpretation?,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM UNDER EXTREME CONDITIONS 121 (Richard Albert & Yaniv Roznai
eds., 2020).
118. See HCJ 9441/07 Agbar v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria, Nevo
Legal Database (2007) (Isr.).
119. See HCJ 5479/06 Mazurin v. State of Israel, Nevo Legal Database (2006)
(Isr.).
120. See, e.g., HCJ 8208/16 Zain v. IDF Commander in West Bank, Nevo Legal
Database (2016) (Isr.); HCJ 2586/16 Ashrif v. State of Israel, Nevo Legal Database
(2016) (Isr.); HCJ 4169/10 Cohen v. Minister of Defense, Nevo Legal Database (2010)
(Isr.).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol42/iss2/2

24

2022

THE DECLINE OF HABEAS CORPUS IN ISRAEL

297

most security cases, habeas corpus writs have come to be used by
security forces for the purpose of locating prisoners,121 in which case,
once the prisoner is found, the legality of his or her detention will be
considered according to the usual procedures determined by the
Detention Law by the president of the District Court with an option of
appeal to the Supreme Court (or according to the Security Instructions
law before Military Courts with a possibility of appeal to the Supreme
Court for their decision).
Another domain in which a statutory alternative to habeas
corpus has developed is prisoner appeals, since the 1980 passing of
the Article Eight “A” of the Prison Ordinance.122 In accordance with
this new ordinance, the legislature put into effect an appeal-track to
District Courts for prisoners, with the main purpose of creating an
efficient deliberative framework for dealing with such appeals. As
mentioned above, before the establishment of this procedure, any
prisoner or detainee was entitled to petition the Supreme Court about
the violation of his or her rights by the prison or detention facility
authorities.123 It was also taken into consideration that the new
arrangement will be more efficient also for the prisoner’s access to the
court within his prison facility. While the authority of the Supreme
Court is preserved in the case of prisoners petitioning for habeas
corpus in matters related to the legality of their imprisonment,124 a
review of court decisions shows that the Supreme Court tends to refer
prisoners to the remedies provided by the regular criminal
procedures even where they claim against the legality of their
imprisonment.125
In summary, since the end of the 1970s, legislative developments
have taken place in domains previously controlled by habeas corpus.
These legislative developments led to the evolution of substantive
law, as well as to the establishment of alternative judicial authorities
that were lower and more accessible parallel to the writ of habeas
corpus. Our conclusion is consistent with studies from England and
the United States, where developments in legislative or statutory

121. See HCJ 8354/20 Anonymous v. IDF Commander in West Bank Nevo Legal
Database (2020) (Isr.).
122. See Prison Ordinance (Amendment No. 5) Law, 5740-1980, 34 LSI. 150
(1980).
123. See Berenson, supra note 40, at 197–98; Criminal Matters Request
7053/01 Anonymous v. State of Israel, 56(1) P.D. 504 (2001) (Isr.).
124. See id.
125. See id.
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alternatives have led to a reduction in the use of habeas corpus.126
As we have shown, these alternatives did not mandate the
complete abandonment of habeas corpus. In fact it was the Supreme
Court, in its actual practice, that made the use of habeas corpus
superfluous and instructed petitioners to make use of the statutory
alternatives, despite legislative gaps.127 Besides, this intensified
legislation in domains previously controlled by habeas corpus relied
on the assumption that the legislature, rather than the courts, had the
authority to determine the circumstances and conditions for denying
persons their liberty. The motives for this alternative legislation may
be diverse, but the additional assumption implied in this alternative
legislation is that the role of the Supreme Court is to serve as an
appeals court for lower courts operating according to the new
legislative developments, rather than a first and last court of human
liberty.
B. Casuistic Rulings, Devoid of Procedural or Substantive
Characteristics
A review of habeas corpus decisions on specific topics, such as
custody disputes between partners or security matters, demonstrates
that even though at its heart lies the primacy of the rule of law, in the
sense of the subordination of citizens and government bodies to the
Supreme Court, nevertheless it lacks any procedural or substantive
character. Accordingly, habeas corpus rulings are characterized by
the promotion of specific justice (procedural or substantive) on a
case-by-case basis. Lacking any procedural or substantive character,
it is doomed to legal stagnation (especially where there has also been
legislative developments).128 In other words, a review of habeas

126. See HALLIDAY, supra note 13, at 253; Vladek, supra note 5, at 953.
127. The HCJ not only encouraged but mandated the use of alternative lower
legal forums. See HCJ 6681/20 Anonymous v. Welfare Officer for the Youth Law North
Jerusalem Area Ramat Eshkol, Nevo Legal Database (2020) (Isr.) (“In short, it is
unsuitable to ‘bypass’ the appropriate appellate court by way of a petition
impersonating to be a habeas corpus petition.”).
128. Constitutional developments did not deny or reduce the Supreme Court’s
authority to directly issue writs of habeas corpus, even though this is what ended up
happening. However, in terms of the letter of the law of the Supreme Court, the
authority to issue writs of habeas corpus belongs to the Supreme Court, even when
statutory appeal procedures are available. Therefore, in our opinion, the absence of
a procedural or substantive character is an independent factor for the decline of
habeas corpus. If habeas corpus had a procedural or substantive character, it would
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corpus rulings on specific topics, such as custody disputes between
partners and security matters, shows that the use of the writ has
lacked a general guiding principle from the start. In the absence of
such guidelines, the rulings are mostly casuistic, and occasionally
even self-contradictory, when the court uses the writ of habeas corpus
to promote substantive or procedural justice on a case-by-case basis.
It is true that casuistry, contradictions, and a lack of coherence in a
legal doctrine do not constitute a sufficient reason for its
abandonment. However, we argue that lack of coherence and the lack
of substantive or procedural character (especially when compared to
parallel legislative arrangements) paved the road to the abandonment
of habeas corpus.
1. Habeas Corpus Rulings in Child Kidnapping Cases
The very first ruling after the foundation of the State of Israel,
which laid the foundations of habeas corpus for child custody, and
established the Supreme Court’s role as champion of the rule of law
and as the impartial defender of the weak is the Amado v. Immigrant
Camp Superintendent.129 The appellant, a mother of two and resident
of France, requested a writ of habeas corpus against the father who
had left France with his children in violation of a decision by a French
civil court, and was holding them in an immigrant camp in Pardes
Chana, Israel.130 The mother’s request was based on another decision
issued by the Paris civil court, after the father did not return with the
children, and according to which the father had forfeited the right to
see the children or keep them. In his response to the Supreme Court,
the father claimed that his wife neglected household maintenance and
the supervision of the children, since she is subject to “psychic
illnesses” incurred by the influence of a mystic cult leader with whom
she had associated with over the past few years.131 He further
asserted that he is afraid his children will be deprived of a Hebrew and

be put to use by judges and litigants according to its unique advantages and
principles. Hence the decline of habeas corpus is also related to this lack of character.
129. See HCJ 125/49 Amado v. Immigrant Camp Superintendent, 4 P.D. 4
(1950) (Isr.) (laying down the foundation of Israeli jurisdiction over the custody of
children); see also Norman Bentwich, Jurisdiction over the Custody of Infants, 1 ISR. L.
REV. 147, 150 (1966).
130. See HCJ 125/49 Amado v. Immigrant Camp Superintendent, 4 P.D. 4
(1950) (Isr.).
131. See id. at 8.
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Jewish education if they remained with their mother.132
The Supreme Court unanimously approved the mother’s request,
making the writ of habeas corpus absolute, and instructed the
children to be returned to their mother’s custody. Chief Justice Smoira
emphasized the obligation to abide by the universally binding (in rem)
foreign court: “the right was established, by an authoritative court, in
favor of one of the parents, and the other parent is acting in opposition
to it, removing the child from his lawful custody, or continuing to hold
it unlawfully—the solution for this is a habeas corpus remedy.”133
Chief Justice Smoira rejected the father’s claim that the children’s
welfare is better served by allowing them to get a national-Jewish
education in Israel, which they could not receive in France.134 The
Supreme Court’s perspective on this claim by the father, thought Chief
Justice Smoira, should be as impartial as that of the court of a third,
uninvolved country.135 From this perspective, Smoira raised another
fear of insincerity on the part of the father in his alleged wishes to give
his children a national-Jewish education,136 and said:
As for public policy, this court and every judge in Israel
would obviously be pleased if every Jewish child that
immigrates into the country were to receive his
education in Israel. But this is not the way to
encourage the immigration of Jews to the Land of
Israel. Heaven forbid that we should turn our country
into a refuge for people who, during the course of
quarrels in their married lives, smuggle their children
away in contravention of the law and of justice. That
way brings no blessing either to the country or to the
children.137
Chief Justice Smoira’s opinion was seconded by Justice
Dunkelblum, Justice Agarnat, Justice Assaf, and Justice Cheshin.138
Justice Assaf and Justice Cheshin expressed serious hesitations and

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
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misgivings,139 while Justice Cheshin disagreed vehemently with
Smoira about the role national considerations should have in a habeas
corpus discussion of the child’s welfare:
The ingathering of the exiles is not just an empty
phrase, and each one of us here today, and each one
who is not with us today, is fully and clearly cognisant
of the fact, that every Jew who immigrates to Israel
aids not only the restoration of the nation and the
building of the land, but also ensures his own security
and future and the security and future of his children
and family. A child from Israel who becomes rooted in
the land of his forefathers has been freed from the
dangers of assimilation and annihilation.140
However, Justice Cheshin concurred with returning the children
to the mother’s custody for their own benefit, reasoning in part that
despite the father’s good intentions regarding his children’s
education, the children were at present in an immigrant camp, far
from the supervision of their mother and other family, dependent on
the good will of others and living off welfare.141
A significant landmark in habeas corpus jurisprudence regarding
kidnapped children, which de facto established the rule of law in the
sense of the subordination of citizens and government authorities to
the Supreme Court, was Schumacher v. Shtarks,142 which was also
responsible for polarization and enmity between secular and religious

139. See id. at 28, 36; see also Pinhas Shifman, The Welfare of the Child in Israeli
Law – The Sole Consideration in the Laws of Minors?, 3 INT’L J. L. & FAM. 185, 192, n.28
(1989) (critiquing the national misgivings with which the Amadou case Justices
struggled).
140. HCJ 125/49 Amado v. Immigrant Camp Superintendent, 4 P.D. 30 (1950)
(Isr.). Justice Cheshin had a completely different impression of the father and his
actions than the other judges: “The father has opened a new chapter in his life. He has
decided to settle among his own people, and to bring his children up in the spirit of
Israel. I was not particularly impressed with the argument of counsel for the mother,
that the father immigrated to Israel because he had kidnapped his children from their
mother's home, and because he could find no other place to which to take them. The
opposite is true: he took his children with him because he had made up his mind to
abandon the life of exile and to live a Jewish life in his own land.” Id. at 31.
141. Id. at 34–35.
142. See HCJ 10/60 Schumacher v. Shtarks, 14 P.D. 299 (1960) (Isr.).
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Israelis.143 Ida and Alter Schumacher had immigrated with their son,
the six-year-old Yossele, and daughter to Israel from the Soviet
Union.144 Due to financial difficulties, among which was the family’s
lack of a permanent domicile, they entrusted their son to the mother’s
ultra-Orthodox parents.145 After they secured a permanent domicile,
they asked for the child to be returned to them, but the grandparents
refused.146 Yossele’s parents petitioned the HCJ, and voiced their
suspicion that the mother’s parents are planning to leave Israel.147
Chief Justice Olshan, and Justices Zussman and Witkon made the writ
absolute and ruled that Yossele was to be returned.148 They noted that
the parents have the right of custody over the child, and the question
of the child’s welfare is not “so complicated or doubtful such as to
require further investigation,”149 and so they were entitled to habeas
corpus from the HCJ and do not need to sue for custody in the court
authorized for dealing with custody disputes (the District Court, at the
time).150 After the mother’s parents persisted in their refusal to
return the child, and eventually even smuggled him abroad, the
Justices instructed for Yossele’s grandfather to be arrested,151 and for
an investigation into the affair by the Israeli police and the national
intelligence agencies.152
After these decisions, Yossele was located by the Mossad in an
ultra-Orthodox family in New York, and returned to his parents in a

143. See Lucy Endle Bassli, The Future of Combining Synagogue and State in
Israel: What Have We Learned in the First 50 Years?, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 477, 496–97
(2000); see also Geraint Rees, Extradition: The Extraditions Acts, 1870 – 1873, 2
CAMBRIAN L. REV. 47, 53-54 (1971); Motti Inbari, The Yossele Schumacher Affair: A Case
Study of Isreal’s Response to Ultra-Orthodox Ideological Crime, 61 J. CHURCH & STATE 20
(2019).
144. See Bassli, supra note 143, at 496.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See HCJ 10/60 Schumacher v. Shtarks, 14, 299 (1960) (Isr.). The
respondents replied that it was Yossele’s parents who were planning to emigrate, and
this is why they are requesting to have the child returned to their custody.
148. See id.
149. In such a case, the burden of proof that the child’s welfare requires the
rejection of the petition of habeas corpus lies on the respondents, noted Chief Justice
Olshan. However, he immediately qualified his statement, writing that it is possible
that a court will not be convinced about the welfare of the child, even though the
petitioners do not provide sufficient proof. Id.
150. See id. at 300.
151. See Motion 309/61 Shtarks v. Schumacher, 15 P.D. 1562 (1961) (Isr.).
152. See Motion 52/60 Schumacher v. Shtarks, 14 P.D. 780 (1960) (Isr.).
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complex operation.153 The Schumacher affair is a significant landmark
in habeas corpus jurisdiction, not because of any doctrinal
developments in it, but mostly because it established the primacy of
the rule of law in the sense of the subordination to the HCJ of citizens
and government authorities.154
These two cases demonstrate well how the HCJ solidified the rule
of law and its own authority by means of writs of habeas corpus.
However, as its rulings became more frequent, it became harder to
harmonize different decisions, and their implications for the HCJ’s
jurisdiction vis-à-vis the District Courts, which was the authorized
court in child custody cases, and foreign courts. The habeas corpus
doctrine in child abductions, as established by the precedents
reviewed here, is composed by a competing set of reasons, rules, and
principles that leaves plenty of discretion in the hands of the Court.
In all habeas corpus rulings related to child kidnappings, an inner
tension can be sensed between this special procedure and the
ordinary procedure conducted in courts authorized to resolve
disputes between parents about custody of children.155 An authorized
court determines the identity of the parent entitled to full custody,
and the other parent’s visitation rights, on the basis of a review of the
“child’s welfare,” in which the court establishes how the child will gain
the maximum benefit from his or her separated parents. The HCJ is
not this “authorized court,” and takes the child’s benefit into account
not in direct deliberations, but rather only as a consideration against
issuing the writ.156 Hence, in most cases it is decided that the child
will be returned to the place where he lived before the kidnapping, on
the assumption that the “center of his or her life” is to be found there,
and the courts there will deal with the matter directly.
153. See Inbari, supra note 143, at 29; Bassli, supra note 143, at 496–97.
154. See Inbari, supra note 143, at 21 (arguing that Ben-Gurion used the
Schumacher affair to show that no group enjoys privileges that place it above the law).
155. See HCJ 125/49 Amado v. Immigrant Camp Superintendent, 4 P.D. 14
(1950) (Isr.) (“So long as the right over the child’s care has not been determined by
an authorized court, and the right itself is contested in a bona fide dispute, the
prosecutor is still in need of the court’s establishing of this right, and this kind of
litigation falls under the personal status clause and is appointed, according to items
47, 51-54 and 64 of the King’s Order in Council of 1922 to the authority of the District
Court both for Israeli natives and foreigners, or—in particular circumstances—the
authority of the religious courts. If the right has been established by the authorized
court in favor of one parent, and the other acts against this and removes the child
from its legal custody or continues to hold it unlawfully—in this case remedy will be
provided by petitioning for habeas corpus.”).
156. See HCJ 113/50 Rimon v. Rimon, 4 P.D. 781 (1950) (Isr.).
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2. Habeas Corpus Rulings in Security Matters
The first judicial decision after the founding of the State of Israel,
which established the framework of habeas corpus security rulings,
and established the HCJ as the champion of the rule of law, defender
of liberty and minorities, is the El-Karbutli case.157 The petitioner,
Ahmad Shuki El-Karbutli, requested a habeas corpus for the release of
his friend, Hajj Ahmad Abu Laben.158 The reason for the arrest of the
detainee was never known to his lawyer, and the authorities kept
putting off his meeting with the detainee, so that the request for
habeas corpus ended up being made by the detainee’s friend.159 From
the response by the state prosecutor, Chaim Cohen, it became clear
that the detainee has been arrested by means of an administrative
detention, signed by the Chief of Staff in accordance with ordinance
111 of the Defense Regulations (Emergency).
The petitioner argued that the arrest warrant made in
accordance with ordinance 111 is illegal for three reasons. First,
ordinance 111 is invalid, since it “violated the conditions of items 2
and 9 of the Mandate-era law,” according to which the Mandate
authorities are responsible for creating guarantees for the civil rights
of citizens and establishing a legal system guaranteeing these
rights.160 Second, ordinance 111 contradicts the principles of
“freedom, justice and peace in light of the vision of the prophets of
Israel,” on which the State of Israel was founded, as recorded in the
Declaration of Independence.161 “Third, on the date of the issuance of
the warrant of arrest, the review committee which sub-ordinance
111(4) was designed to establish was not yet in existence, so the
entire ordinance 111 should not be activated.”162
The HCJ accepted the petition unanimously and instructed for the
release of the detainee. This move was surprising, as the HCJ was
quite young, and its institutional independence was still in doubt;
nevertheless it was ready to grapple with the military authorities in
the midst of a war of independence, and despite the fact that the
detainee was an Arab resident in recently conquered territory.163
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
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See HCJ 7/48 El-Karbutli v. Minister of Defense, 2 P.D. 5 (1949) (Isr.).
See id. at 8.
See id.
Id.
Id.; HJC 10/48 Zeev v. Gubernik, 1 P.D. 85 (1948) (Isr.).
HCJ 7/48 El-Karbutli v. Minister of Defense, 2 P.D. 9 (1949) (Isr.).
See id.
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However, a review of the rationale of the court in the El-Karbutli case
reveals that the decision was based on extremely narrow
constitutional grounds, while refusing to arrogate the authority to
cancel primary legislation on the grounds of impingement upon
rights.
Regarding the first reason, the HCJ accepted the argument of the
petitioner that the Mandate law was binding on the Mandate
authorities, and that all actions or laws undertaken must not
contradict it.164 However, it was determined that the items under
consideration do not specify the nature of the rights which the
Mandate is expected to guarantee, and do not specify to what extent
one may legislate laws that curtail individual rights for the sake of the
public good.165 The HCJ further argued that the legislation of
Administration Ordinance 111(1) itself was carried out in order to
guarantee the welfare of the public, even if it was abused in the past.166
Consequently, they rejected the petitioner’s first reason.167
As to his second reason, the justices repeated their position from
the Zeev v. Gubernik case,168 that even though the Declaration of
Independence expresses the vision of the people, it is not a
Constitution by which one may nullify and strike down legislation.169
164. In this fashion the court accepted the Mandate-era Jewish leadership’s
claim, that the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, contradicted the Mandate
writ, and thus are null and void. See id. at 26.
165. See HCJ 7/48 El-Karbutli v. Minister of Defense, 2 P.D. 12 (1949) (Isr.).
The HCJ voiced a remark which has since been forgotten, and which holds that “courts
do not create rights – that power belongs to the legislature. Courts merely ensure that
existing rights are kept and honored.” Id. This approach stands in stark opposition
to a long line of Supreme Court precedents. See HCJ 1/49 Bejerano v. Minister of
Police, 2 P.D. 80 (1949) (Isr.); HCJ 144/50 Sheib v. Minister of Defense, 5 P.D. 399
(1951) (Isr.); HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am Co., Ltd. v. Minister of the Interior, 7 P.D. 87 (1953)
(Isr.); HCJ 176/54 Yehoshua v. Appeals Tribunal Under the Invalids (Pensions and
Rehabilitation) Law, 9 P.D. 617 (1955) (Isr.); EA 1/65 Yeredor v. Superintendent of
Central Electoral Committee for the Sixth Knesset, 19(3) P.D. 365 (1965) (Isr.).
166. See HCJ 7/48 El-Karbutli v. Minister of Defense, 2 P.D. 12 (1949) (Isr.).
167. See id.
168. See HJC 10/48 Zeev v. Gubernik, 1 P.D. 85 (1948) (Isr.).
169. See HCJ 7/48 El-Karbutli v. Minister of Defense, 2 P.D. 6 (1949) (Isr.).
Some scholars argued that the Zeev decision, adopted almost literally and completely
in El-Karbutli, squandered a historic opportunity to recognize the Declaration of
Independence as the Constitution of the State of Israel. See Joshua Segev, Justifying
Judicial Review: The Changing Methodology of the Israeli Supreme Court, in ISRAEL’S
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 105, 107 (Gideon Sapir, Daphene Barak-Erez &
Aharon Barak eds., 2013). Professor Pnina Lahav took this argument a step further
when she claimed that by not recognizing the Declaration of Independence as Israel's
Constitution, the HCJ adopted a majoritarian perception of democracy. See PNINA
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The petitioner in El-Karbutli contested this position on the grounds
that it is based on the assumption that the Declaration of
Independence is a strictly political document.170 The HCJ responded
forcefully that the Declaration of Independence is not the
Constitution, because the latter would have to be enacted by the
Constituent Assembly.171
The petitioner’s third reason was the one accepted by the HCJ.
The HCJ reflected on whether the instruction in Ordinance 111(4)
concerning the establishment of a review committee is self-standing,
or whether it should be seen as a precondition for putting into effect
the arrest authorities given to the military commander—an authority
which should not be activated before a legal body has not been
appointed to deliberate on objections to detention. According to the
HCJ, the relative insignificance of the right to appeal to the counseling
committee is itself a reason to suspect that the legislature’s intention
was that this right should be guarded zealously, so that at least one
guarantee of his liberty will be reserved to the detainee—the critical
supervision of a review committee.172 It is noteworthy that during
deliberations on the El-Karbutli affair a counseling committee had
already been established, and so the military commander did have the
right to use ordinance 111. However, the HCJ rejected the State’s
argument that this is a formal, technical or trifling issue. The HCJ
explained the authorities are no less subordinate to the law of the land
as any private citizen and must use their force according to the limits
placed by the legislature.173
Hence, the HCJ confirmed the writ of habeas corpus and called for
the release of the prisoner “unless there be some legal reason to
detain him,”174 and also ruled for compensation in his favor. To this
end, the HCJ defended the prisoner and ordered his release. However,

LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY 92
(1997).
170. HCJ 7/48 El-Karbutli v. Minister of Defense, 2 P.D. 13 (1949) (Isr.).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 14 (“There are strong reasons to suspect, therefore, that when
the legislator placed such a dangerous weapon as ordinance 111 in the hands of the
authorities, his intention was that the founding of a committee by the authorities will
be a precondition for their putting the ordinance into effect.”).
173. See id.
174. In other words, the Supreme Court justices presented the military
authorities with the loophole of re-arresting the detainee by issuing a new warrant of
administrative detention, which will now be legal, since meanwhile the counseling
committee had been established.
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the critics are right in pointing out that the HCJ did not establish in ElKarbutli a broad constitutional defensive bulwark, which
acknowledges individual and civil rights; it also did not strike down
the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945.175 Moreover, the request
that, prior to impairing the individual’s liberty, a review committee
will be formed, to which the individual could bring complaints, was
also revealed to have only minor implications, since, as stated above,
a review committee had already been established at the timewhen
the HCJ deliberated El-Karbutli.176 Hence, the value of this decision is
in establishing the axiom of universal subordination to the law and to
critical judgment; even administrative detention is not exempt. But
this is the importance of the precedent.
Another foundational security habeas corpus decision,
mentioned above, was El-Koury.177 According to the security
authorities, El-Koury presented a threat to the public, but they lacked
the evidence to bring a criminal process against him for activities
against the Jewish populace before the founding of the State of Israel
and during the War of Independence. El-Koury petitioned the HCJ
against his arrest, making three arguments: first, the warrant did not
specify the name of the detainee; second, the warrant did not specify
where the detainee was to be held; third, the Chief-of-Staff did not
exercise his independent judgment, but had just rubber-stamped the
recommendation of the arrest committee.
Justice Agarnat, joined by justice Olshan and Justice Silberg,
instructed to release the petitioner, citing the seemingly technical
defect that the warrant for the arrest of El-Koury did not specify a
place of arrest, despite the requirement of ordinance 111(1) of the
Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945. According to Justice Agarnat,
the omission of the place of arrest is a substantial defect, given the
concern for human liberty ensconced in the maxim of English
common law that “every man is presumed innocent.”178 This grand
rule matches the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and its
affirmation that Israel will be founded on the principles of liberty,

175. This was indeed the criticism voiced about the Supreme Court’s rulings in
cases where the legal validity of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, were
under review.
176. Future attempts to use the precedent-setting statement in the El-Karbutli
failed. For example, see HCJ 5973/92 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister
of Defense, 47(1) P.D. 267 (1993) (Isr.).
177. See HCJ 95/49 El-Koury v. IDF Chief of Staff, 4 P.D. 34 (1950) (Isr.).
178. See id. at 37.
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justice and peace.179 With these words, Justice Agarnat deviated
slightly from the approach which rejected the constitutional
relevance of the Declaration of Independence as a source of rights and
liberties, and softened the legal tradition established in the Zeev and
El-Karbutli cases, according to which the Declaration of Independence
cannot serve as a Constitution, which can be used to invalidate laws
and orders.
Therefore, Professor Lahav is correct to claim that “the El-Koury
judgment did not constitute a true breakthrough in the Israeli
perception of civil liberty.”180 This is because it largely relied on the
British judicial model, which resolves such issues by means of the
tools of administrative law – itself fundamentally a branch of common
law, moving from case to case—rather than on the instruments of the
American constitutional model. The HCJ’s assertion that an arrest
warrant issued by virtue of ordinance 111, and which did not specify
the place of arrest, as required by the ordinance, constitutes a severe
defect which annuls the warrant – this claim too turned out to be a
precedent of only limited significance.181 Hence, the value of this
judicial decision lies in its establishing individual liberty as axiomatic,
yet the questions about how and in what circumstances it may be
limited remain unanswered.
These two decisions demonstrate well how the HCJ established
the rule of law and its authority in security matters by means of
habeas corpus. However, we can see clearly that the Court refused to
set down substantial or procedural content regarding the causes and
circumstances for issuing a writ of habeas corpus.
Another important decision which demonstrates the procedural
179. See id.
180. LAHAV, supra note 169, at 139.
181. See, e.g., ADA 2/86 Anonymous v. Def. Minister, 41(2) P.D. 508 (1986)
(Isr.) (a mistake was made in printing the date of the administrative detention
warrant, which led to extending the detention by eighteen months instead of six
months. The appellant claimed that the defect which was discovered is essential, and
nullifies the warrant, since it applies to an essential component of the warrant. In this
argument, the appellant made use of the ruling in the El-Koury case); see also HCJ
95/49 El-Koury v. IDF Chief of Staff, 4 P.D. 34 (1950) (Isr.). The HCJ rejected this
argument, citing Justice Agarnat’s reasoning in the El-Koury case that “a merely
technical imprecision will not suffice for nullifying a warrant.” In fact, the Supreme
Court did make clear that issuing a warrant for a longer term than that specified by
the Emergency Authorities Law (Arrests) of 1979 will count as an essential, not
technical defect, if the warrant was produced deliberately for a longer period of time
than that allowed by law. However, in this case the Supreme Court decided that the
mistake is merely a “slip of the pen,” and consequently rejected the appeal.
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and substantive emptiness of habeas corpus ruling is Heruti v. Minister
of Police (1953).182 Yaakov Heruti’s wife applied for habeas corpus
for the release of her husband, arrested without a warrant by the
police for allegedly violating the Ordinance of Official Secrets.183 The
question of the legality of the arrest depended on an interpretation of
§ 20 of the Ordinance, which stated that a violator of the order of
official secrets may be arrested without a warrant. The question
under dispute was whether this section permitted holding a detainee
under arrest indefinitely, or whether the legislator’s intent was only
to authorize the police to catch and arrest the suspect without a
warrant, but then to deal with him or her according to accepted
procedures and bring the detainee before a Magistrate Court judge
within 48 hours of the arrest. In fact, it turned out at the Supreme
Court hearing that the respondent’s position was that the detainee
could be held indefinitely, but that meanwhile, the military prosecutor
had issued an arrest warrant according to § 13 of the Terror
Prevention Ordinance of 1948.
Justice Cheshin explained that “it has been decided many times
that in habeas corpus cases the Court considers the state of affairs that
holds on the day of the hearing of the response to the conditional
writ.”184 Hence, if Heruti’s arrest is legal according to the Terror
Prevention Ordinance, there is no longer any need to deliberate on the
interpretation of § 20 of the Official Secret Ordinance.
The counsel for the petitioner argued that this warrant is also
illegal: according to § 8 of the Terror Prevention Ordinance, if the
government declares in an official newspaper that a given group of
people are a terrorist organization, that declaration will serve as proof
in any legal hearing that this is the case. Indeed, the government had
published such a notice, citing the aforementioned § 8, and alleging
that a certain group of people, whose name the announcement
mentions (sixteen people including Yaakov Heruti), are a terrorist
organization. The petitioner’s lawyer argued that when a person is
accused of membership in a terrorist organization, the government
must prove his or her affiliation with that organization. In the present
case, however, the government had not officially declared the
organization a terrorist organization, but only listed the people’s
names and called them a terrorist group.185 By doing this, argued the
182.
183.
184.
185.

See HCJ 116/53 Heruti v. Minister of Police, 7 P.D. 615 (1953) (Isr.).
Id. at 616.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
See id. at 617.
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lawyer, the government had in effect convicted the detainee before he
was brought to trial, an action that should nullify the arrest warrant.
The HCJ rejected this reasoning:
At this stage of the proceedings, the court has only two
questions: First, whether the military prosecutor had
the authority to issue an arrest warrant. Second, if he
followed the written procedure prescribed by law.
The detainee is suspected of committing an offense
under the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, since
his arrest warrant was issued by a military prosecutor.
However, there is no real proof that the military
prosecutor acted without authority or deviated from
the common practice. . . . At this stage of the legal
process, the detainee is not yet on trial and the
magistrate judge is not reviewing and assessing the
evidence against the detainee. For the most part the
evidence infrastructure is incomplete and one of the
main purposes of the arrest is to give the police the
time to collect this material without interruption. For
the purpose of issuing an arrest warrant, it is
sufficient, for example, if the police attorney declares
under oath that there is a well-founded suspicion that
the detainee has committed a certain offense. . . . Hence
the case before us: the military prosecutor issued an
arrest warrant against the detainee. The reason was
undoubtedly the that the detainee was suspected of
having committed one of the offenses stated in the
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance. However, this
Ordinance specifies several offenses in addition to the
offense of belonging to a terrorist organization. Thus,
in order to issue the arrest warrant, the military
prosecutor did not need the government’s
announcement at all.186
The final case from the Supreme Court’s formative period which
we wish to discuss is the Bouganim v. Chief of Staff.187 The petitioner,
a mandatory service soldier in the IDF, was brought before a Military
District Court and accused of several offenses, including reckless
186.
187.
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behavior and threats against his commander. The military tribunal
convicted the petitioner on all counts and gave him a prison sentence.
The soldier then appealed to the Military Court of Appeals, which
overruled one of the counts on which he had been convicted, but
convicted him on another. The petitioner next turned to the Supreme
Court, petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that he
was being held unlawfully. The centerpiece of his complaint was that
the Court of Appeals had overstepped its authority or that its decision
was mistaken.
Justice Zussman rejected the petition. First, noted the judge, had
the appellant been held by virtue of an unauthorized judicial decision,
the HCJ would have instructed for his release without any further
investigation or requirements.188
However, explained Justice
Zussman, no basis could be found for the claim of lack of authority,
since it is precisely within the authority of the Military Court of
Appeals to consider appeals from other military tribunals. A different
question is whether the HCJ will instruct for the release of the
petitioner through the principle of habeas corpus, if the military court
made a mistake or misused its power in making its judicial decision.
The answer to this question, according to Justice Zussman, is that even
a judge who errs is acting within the bounds of his or her authority,
for if else “only correct judicial decisions will be considered to fall
within the bounds of authority, and there will be no end of
deliberations, as the question may always arise whether a mistake has
occurred in the decision, and it should be nullified for lack of
authority.”189 In such a case the HCJ will refrain from providing the
petitioner with a habeas corpus remedy which would require his
immediate release, but the petitioner may still appeal to the Supreme
Court for a “writ of review,” asking the Supreme Court to review the
correctness of the decision, and overrule it if made in error.
The reason for this conclusion stems from the distinction of
habeas corpus in contrast to the alternative appeal procedure of the
writ of review. First, Justice Zussman notes that in habeas corpus it is
the prison director holding the detainee, who is required to justify the
conclusion of the Military Court of Appeals:
This is an impossible injunction for the prison
director: while it is true that he is responsible for not
188. See id. at 1658; see also Aryeh Rosenbloom, Habeas Corpus - and the Writ
of Review, 15 HAPRAKLIT 104, 105 (1959).
189. HCJ 86/58 Bouganim v. Chief of Staff, 12 P.D. 1658 (1958) (Isr.).
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detaining any man on the basis of a nullified judicial
decision, he should not be burdened with the
additional burden of defending the mistakes of a court,
if such mistakes have been made.190
Second, Justice
considerations:

Zussman

raises

broad

systemic

legal

While review processes are concerned with
deliberation on the validity of the judicial decision,
and the Supreme Court will decide the case in one way
or another, in habeas corpus the Court is merely
concerned with releasing a man from detention. Its
reflection on the validity of the decision which led to
his arrest will only be an incidental concern, which is
not universally binding, and which applies only to the
two parties concerned in the matter . . . To conclude: a
decision which is overruled by the procedure habeas
corpus has been overruled incidentally, and this
cancellation is not an act of Court but rather applies
only between the two deliberating parties. Between
other parties, if the question should arise again
whether the decision is right or wrong, the Court will
be entitled to decide that it was legitimate, and the
validity of the act is given only partially. This is an
undesirable result, and we should prevent it by
pointing out to the citizen the proper means by which
he or she can overcome the judicial decision.191
We would like to pause and reflect on this systemic argument.
Justice Zussman follows ancient common law maxim that habeas
corpus does not create res judicata, which entails that one may always
ask for it and seek a new court and judge who might accept one’s
petition.192 The basis for this practice was the significance attributed
by English courts to human liberty, which they refused to weaken out
of systemic procedural considerations. However, Justice Zussman
notes a deficiency in this habeas corpus practice: habeas corpus does
not realize the goal of the finality of judicial deliberations, and can
190.
191.
192.
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even lead to contradictory results, when in one process it is assessed
that a detention is illegal, and so the detainee should be released,
while in another the same parties or others will determine that the
detention is legal.
In this way, Justice Zussman prioritizes
considerations of directing behavior and the institutional
considerations of judicial administration, and effectively establishes
habeas corpus’ inferiority to ordinary appeal procedures.
It is no coincidence that the usual praises for the importance of
habeas corpus for the preservation of human liberty in a country
which has no written constitution are absent from this judicial
decision.193 It is also no coincidence that the Bouganim case is cited
frequently in contemporary jurisdiction, such as in the case of
Anonymous v. The Israeli Police,194 in which the status of the writ has
been downgraded.
C. Israel’s Constitutional Revolution and Habeas Corpus
A third factor leading to the decline of habeas corpus is Israel’s
“Constitutional Revolution”. In 1992 the Knesset enacted two Basic
Laws—Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation195 and Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty.196 They enshrined several human rights in Basic
Laws, among them and relevant to our discussion are dignity197 and

193. In an article from the late 1950s, legal scholar Aryeh Rosenbloom
investigated the negative effect of the Bouganim case legal practice on civil liberties
in a state without a constitution: “[a]nd here we must ask ourselves whether we can
truly consider justified the narrow domain the Supreme Court has allowed for
procedures of habeas corpus, which constitute one of the foundational guarantees of
civil liberty. In a state without a written constitution, one that is particularly liable
for constricting civil liberty due to its security situation and other concerns, any
unnecessary restriction of habeas corpus (as well as of other prerogative procedures)
could end up limiting civilians in their effort to realize one of the foundational
liberties… Who could predict in advance all those unforeseeable circumstances that
could arise in habeas corpus hearings, and where the Court will fail to redeem
appellants deserving of a remedy?” See Rosenbloom, supra note 188, at 106.
194. See HCJ 594/16 Anonymous v. The Israeli Police & Samaria Division & The
Judean Military Court, Nevo Legal Database ¶ 10 (2016) (Isr.).
195. See Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, SH 114 (1992) (Isr.), as replaced
by Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, SH 90 (1994) (Isr.).
196. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, SH 150 (1992) (Isr.).
197. See id. at §§ 2, 4. “PRESERVATION OF LIFE, BODY, AND DIGNITY: There shall be
no violation of the life, body or dignity of any person as such.” PROTECTION OF LIFE, BODY
AND DIGNITY: All Persons are entitled to protection of their life, body and dignity.”
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liberty.198 Since the enactment of the two Basic Laws, many Israeli
legal scholars argued that Israel had undergone a Constitutional
Revolution, which resulted in a formal constitution.199 In United
Mizrachi Bank Ltd.,200 Chief Justice Aharon Barak, joined by a majority
of the Supreme Court, held that since 1992 Israel achieved, fullfledged constitutional review and that Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty enjoys normative superiority; hence new legislation that
infringes upon rights protected by the two Basic Laws must satisfied
the requirements of the Limitation Clause.201
Since the Mizrachi decision, Supreme Court justices have evinced
a noticeable normative preference to discuss questions of human
liberty through the framework of judicial review of primary
legislation and the tests of the Limitation Clause. The great
constitutional decisions of the last few decades – even those dealing
with classical topics previously controlled by habeas corpus, such as
freedom from arrest and imprisonment on security and criminal
grounds – are no longer considered subjects fit for habeas corpus.
Thus, for example, in Tsemach v. Minister of Defence [1999],202 a
mandatory service soldier who was arrested by a military policeman
and held for five days without being brought before a judge petitioned
the HCJ.203 In his petition, he argued that the provisions included in
the Military Jurisdiction Act - 1995, according to which he was
arrested, contradict Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and should
be strike down by the Court.204 A short time after petitioning, the
soldier was brought before a military tribunal, which extended his
detention. After being put on trial, sentenced to two months and a half,
198. See id. at § 5. “Personal Liberty: There shall be no deprivation or
restriction of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or
otherwise.”
199. Aharon Barak, A Constitutional Revolution: Israel’s Basic Laws, 4 CONST. F.
83, 83(1993); Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of the Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 36 n.70 (2002). For a critical assessment of the use
of the term Constitutional Revolution with the enactment of the two Basic Laws and
the resulting conclusion that Israel has a formal constitution: See Gary Jeffrey
Jacobsohn, After the Revolution, 34 ISR. L. REV. 139, 139 (2000); Joshua Segev, Who
Needs a Constitution? In Defense of Non-Decision Constitution-Making Tactic in Israel,
70 ALBANY L. REV. 409, 456–457 (2007).
200. CA 6821/93 United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Cooperative Village Migdal,
49(4) P.D. 221 at ¶ 77 (1995 (Isr.)).
201. See id.
202. HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense, 53(5) P.D. 241 (1999) (Isr.).
203. See id. at 248.
204. See id. at 249.
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and serving his sentence, the soldier was released. Thus, the soldier
reduced his petition and requested the court declare sec. 234 and
237a of the Military Jurisdiction Act null and void. The soldier’s
petition was united with another petition made by five officers
serving as military legal defenders, who requested that the HCJ nullify
these sections and prohibit arresting soldiers unless this is called for
by the needs of the investigation, a concern over tampering with the
legal process, or a risk of escape from justice.205
Justice Zamir, writing for the majority, noted that the two
petitions are abstract and theoretical in nature, since they are not
based on any set of facts and do not request a remedy for a particular
case, but rather raise a general question.206 The original petition had
been concrete, arguing that the petitioner is being detained by an
invalid legal order, and so it petitioned for his release; but since the
prolongation of the arrest by the military tribunal, that petition also
become theoretical. Justice Zamir pointed out that as a rule, the
Supreme Court refuses to deal with purely theoretical questions.
Exceptions are to be made only when the petition raises an important
question, the illegal conduct is capable of repetition, yet evading
review since dispute or injury is short term. According to Justice
Zamir, the Tzemach case may be considered such an exception:
It raises an important question, which implicates
principles basic to the rule of law. It is a question of the
authority to infringe on personal liberty by arresting
and detaining someone without judicial oversight.
The question arises every day, year after year, for
many soldiers – according to the respondents, close to
10,000 soldiers each year. The question, however, is
short-lived: it arises when a soldier is arrested by a
military police officer; it is concrete for just a few days,
until the soldier is released or brought before a
military tribunal to extend his arrest, and then the
question dies. . . . The end result would be to render
the decision to detain soldiers immune from judicial
review. That would be a harsh result, inconsistent
with the rule of law.207

205.
206.
207.

See id.
See id. at 250.
Id.
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The absence of a writ of habeas corpus in Justice Zamir’s words
is glaring. If thousands of soldiers are arrested every year, and the
decision to arrest them is impervious to judicial review, this is indeed
an extreme consequence which cannot be squared with the rule of
law. However, if this assessment is correct, the failure is first and
foremost that of the institution of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court’s
main method of prevention of arbitrary detention. Minority Justice
Kedmi was of the opinion that there is no justification for holding a
discussion of such theoretical questions, stating that the pushing off
the discussion of the question of warrantless arrest in the military to
actual cases will not create an “immunity from judicial review.” 208
Justice Kedmi did not mention habeas corpus explicitly, but that is
precisely the central tool of supervision of unlawful arrests in actual
cases. Unease about the absence of habeas corpus from the words of
Justice Zamir becomes even more pressing when we consider the fact
that some of the petitioners serve as military defense lawyers: are
they really unaware that arbitrary arrests can be legally avoided by
making an emergency petition for habeas corpus? Certainly, this is
common knowledge. However, it seems that the petitioners, like the
majority justices, prefer to establish the rule of law by means of a
general ruling that would directly target the legislation inimical to
individual liberty. They prefer this to having to determine in each
particular case, in an incidental manner that only obligates the two
parties in this particular case.
Another case which demonstrates the decline of habeas corpus
in the wake of the Constitutional Revolution is Human Rights Section
v. Minister of Treasury [2009],209 in which the Supreme Court
deliberated on the constitutionality of the policy of privatizing
prisons. A majority of the Supreme Court (against the dissenting
opinion of Justice Edmund Levy) accepted the petition and canceled
the law amending the Prison Act, due to the disproportional damage
caused to the constitutional rights to individual liberty and human
dignity of prisoners, who will serve their sentence in a prison that
would be managed and operated by a private corporation. This
decision, similarly to that in Tzemach, relies on the importance of
individual liberty, the fact that individual liberty is a condition for
other liberties, and on the dire consequences of curtailing it.210 A
208. Id. at 250.
209. See HCJ 2605/05 Human Rights Section v. Minister of Treasury, 63(2) P.D.
545 (2009) (Isr.).
210. See id. at 598–99.
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complete account of the richness of arguments adduced by the
majority justices for their conclusions about the illegality of the
amendment to the Prison Act is beyond the scope of this article. At
present, it will suffice to say that the majority judges determined that
the transfer of the authority to manage and operate prisons from the
state to a private for-profit corporation would contradict the right to
liberty in a way that fails the Limitation Clause tests.
The Justice Edmund Levy concurred with the majority justices
about the need to guarantee prisoners’ basic rights, and that the
privatization of incarceration services and their entrusting to a
private corporation deepens the damage done to the prisoner’s right
to liberty and dignity. However, Levy dissented in the conclusions, as
well as about the result of overruling the law.211 In his view, at the
present stage the review is premature. Justice Levy considered that
judicial review about the future is only legitimate when there is a
significant risk of damage to protected rights, and a potential for such
damage alone is insufficient, since the law’s intent is to improve
incarceration conditions in prison, and the financial profit is a means
towards this end. In his view, the Limitation Clause is not a perfectly
sound foothold when we are dealing with merely theoretical
assumptions. Hence, his view was that this complex issue, including
the question of its influence on basic human rights and on other
protected values, should be tested out in reality before being brought
before judicial review.212
Levy’s position in Human Rights Section, bearing a striking
resemblance to Justice Kedmi’s position in the Tzemach, shows how
judicial review takes place in the age of the constitutional revolution,
in fields previously controlled by habeas corpus: the Supreme Court
protects human liberties from a theoretical, broad and principled
perspective, divorced from concrete circumstantial considerations or
the concerns of specific petitioner. In our opinion, the rejection of
Justice Levy’s minority opinion by the majority justices demonstrates
their systemic and methodological preference to avoid deliberating
on topics of human liberty from the perspective of the actual case and
the specific person, which are hallmarks of habeas corpus. This
systemic preference in the case of the Human Rights Section is
particularly conspicuous if one considers the fact that even though the
phenomenon of privatization is a new one, habeas corpus could still

211.
212.

See id. at 708.
See id.
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have been utilized in these contemporary circumstances. As
mentioned above, starting from the seventeenth century, use has been
made of habeas corpus to supervise ‘private’ forms of detention, i.e.
detention by private bodies for profit (e.g., the emancipation of
slaves).213
To avoid misunderstanding, it is important to note that the
Supreme Court has made use of habeas corpus to impose and extend
its authority over other institutions of government, as the decisions in
the El-Karbutli, El-Koury and Schumacher cases demonstrate clearly.
Nevertheless, in its formative years the Supreme Court established its
authority very gradually, moving sequentially from case to case. By
contrast, in the constitutional era, the Supreme Court prefers to assert
its authority through wide-ranging, constitutional decisions that
concern the constitutionality and interpretation of Knesset’s
legislation.214
Having reviewed the judicial landmarks over recent years in
guaranteeing human liberty, we can note also a discrepancy between
the two institutions – habeas corpus and the judicial review of
primary legislation, as it is applied by the HCJ today. This discrepancy
comes to a head-on collision in the case of Anonymous v. The State of
Israel215 in at least three aspects. First, in Anonymous v. State of Israel,
the Supreme Court discusses the “constitutional question” of
extending a security suspect’s detention in his absence, although the
question is theoretical and bears no practical relevance for the
petitioner’s private matter.216 Second, the Supreme Court in practice
chooses the mode of action of overruling the law (which permitted
holding hearings about security detainee’s cases in absentia) instead
of acting in a sporadic, individual way by granting habeas corpus writs
instructing detainees to be brought before the court on a
circumstantial and fragmentary basis, while reviewing the
justification in preventing the participation of the detainee in the
hearings, on a case-by-case basis. Third, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Anonymous v. State of Israel is a principled precedent, binding on
any future person or institution who would seek to prevent the
213. See supra Part II.
214. Joshua Segev, The Changing Role of the Israeli Supreme Court and the
Question of Legitimacy, 20 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 39–46 (2006).
215. See Criminal Matter Request 8823/07 Anonymous v. State of Israel, 63(3)
P.D. 500 (2010) (Isr.) ¶ 1, 8-11 (2010) (Isr.) (Rivlin, E., J., opinion).
216. Criminal Matter Request 8823/07 Anonymous v. State of Israel, 63(3) P.D.
500 ¶ 8-11 (2010) (Isr.) (Rivlin, E., J., opinion).
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presence of a security detainee in a discussion of his case. If it were a
habeas corpus petition, the decision would have been incidental and
valid only between the disputing sides; it would have sufficed to
obligate the authorities to bring the detainee to court, but nothing
more.
Furthermore, in recent years, when some petitioners and human
rights organizations have tried to use habeas corpus petitions in a
more principled way they were rejected unequivocally. In the 2020
case Anonymous v. IDF Commander in West Bank,217 a request for
habeas corpus was submitted to the HCJ in order to reveal the fate of
a minor, detained a day earlier by the Israeli Security forces. By order
of the Court, the responded informed the Court the minor was
detained in an operation against stones and Molotov cocktails
throwers, and was released a day after his arrest subject to the deposit
of bail by his father.218 Notwithstanding the aforesaid, the petitioners
requested not to erase their petition, on the grounds that the petition
also includes a request for general relief addressed to respondents, to
hold up-to-date information in real time on the arrest of suspects in
security matters.219 The Court outright rejected their request noting
that, since the petitioners were provided with details of the
circumstances of the detention, and when the detainee was released
into the hands of his family members, the petition was therefore
exhausted, and must be erased.220 The Court reasoned that in respect
to the general relief sought, the petitioners did not satisfy the
requirement of exhaustion of proceedings, and that entangling the
general relief with the write for habeas corpus, which is inherently an
emergency remedy, is inappropriate.221
Moreover, one can even detect a retreat from the perception,
specified in Rimon, Schumacher, and the common law tradition, that

217. See HCJ 8354/20 Anonymous v. IDF Commander in West Bank, Nevo
Legal Database (2020) (Isr.).
218. See id. at ¶ 2.
219. See id.
220. See id. at ¶ 4.
221. See id; see also HCJ 7206/20 Anonymous v. IDF Commander in West Bank,
Nevo Legal Database ¶ 6 (2020) (Isr.) (“After considering the matter, we found that
the petition in its current form [as a habeas corpus] had exhausted itself and should
be deleted. Once the details were provided to the petitioners regarding the
circumstances of the petitioner's arrest and his whereabouts, the essence of the
petition became irrelevant. As for the other remedies requested, we found that in
circumstances where the details of the case were clarified, these general remedies
need not be litigated in this procedure.”).
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habeas corpus applies between private individuals as well as between
the individual and the state. In Anonymous v. Israeli Police222 two
parents petitioned the HCJ to locate their fourteen-year-old son, after
living for several months with his grandparents and his uncle, and in
circumstances somewhat similar to Schumacher.223 The parents
petitioned the HCJ to order their son’s return and the Israeli Police “to
conduct a serious and comprehensive investigation” in order to find
out the place in which the minor is being held by their relatives.224 The
HCJ requested the police to update on the matter, but noted that it had
been ex gratia since petitions of habeas corpus deal with allegation of
unlawful detention or imprisonment of persons by the authorities and
that the Israeli police do not need a judicial order in order to perform
its function by law.225 After the police informed the Court that the
minor had been located and had been admitted to the hospital by
emergency order, after a psychiatrist’s examination, the Court order
the petition to be erased and remarked that there was no place to
petition the HCJ, before exhausting all proceedings, and especially not
to use a habeas corpus petition, whose functional authority is very
different from the matter brought before the Court by the parents.226
Hence, in Anonymous v. IDF Commander in West Bank and
Anonymous v. Israeli Police, the original view, according to which the
principal role of HCJ is to defend, regulate, reform and enforce human
liberty in the public and private spheres by the writ of habeas corpus
has been abandoned. The modern view espouses habeas corpus as an
emergency remedy not suited to the principled constitutional era and
should be employed as a last resort against governmental authorities.
V.

CONCLUSION

In this Article we have argued that in the last three decades one
may mark a decline in the conspicuousness of the writ of habeas
corpus in Israeli jurisprudence. We identified three factors for this
decline: first, the development of substantive and procedural
statutory alternatives, which made habeas corpus superfluous.
Second, a review of habeas corpus in specific matters, such as custody
222. See HCJ 1571/21 Anonymous v. Israeli Police, Nevo Legal Database ¶ 1
(2021) (Isr.).
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. See id. at ¶ 4.
226. See id. at ¶ 5.
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disputes between partners and security matters reveals that the use
of the writ was lacking any procedural or substantive character from
the very beginning. Third, the adoption of a judicial review of primary
legislation led to the handling of constitutional disputes through a
direct attack on primary legislation, and in accordance with test of the
Limitation Clause of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
The common denominator of these three factors for the decline
of habeas corpus in Israel is the preference for grandiose
constitutional engineering of the space of human liberty over smallscale constitutional engineering. In other words, both the legislature
and the Supreme Court today prefer to protect human liberty from
detention and imprisonment by means broad rules and deep
principles, as we can see in both contemporary codifying legislation
and principle-based constitutional review decisions. The legislature’s
motives for grandiose constitutional arrangements and those of the
Supreme Court are not precisely congruent. The assumption behind
the development of the statutory alternatives is that the legislator,
rather than the courts, has the authority to determine the
circumstances and conditions for denying a person his or her liberty.
By contrast, the assumption behind the Israeli jurisprudence of
judicial review is that the Supreme Court is entrusted with the defense
of human liberty, and will examine the constitutionality of its denial
in accordance with the tests of the Limitation Clause. What these two
factors have in common is the desire to structure the space of human
liberty through grandiose constitutional engineering.

49

